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A Last Word?

Woods Effects

by Dean N. Essig

Some issues remain partisan much longer than actually useful -- woods effects is one. We will encourage as much debate on this subject as you, the readers, desire and allow. After Dave's article last issue, I got two phone calls from the opposition and a couple of notes from supporters. A couple of misconceptions about what Dave actually said came up more than once, so I decided to write this short article to put them to rest. The issue itself remains solved or unsolved as per your tastes. Articles from either side will be welcome.

First off, Dave does not imply that "because the soldiers form ranks between the trees, they are in clear view and shot." His basic tenant is that the trees act as the rods in a nuclear reactor, absorbing bullets, and that the lines draw ever closer together because of limited visibility. The proximity of the lines compensates for the"absorption factor" between the lines. His comments regarding the lines being formed between trees was merely to eliminate any possible idea that the troops broke ranks and each hid behind his personal tree -- as in more modern tactics.

Second, in the CWB system, two lines firing at each other shoutd not be assumed to be one hex distance (200 yards) apart. Instead, one hex range is considered to be a "nominal range for effect" whereby a given firefight may be closer if conditions require it to maintain that nominal fire effect level.

In woods, the lines are assumed to be closer together -- in order to give them the correct nominal range effects. This is a behind the scenes concept which the player need not know about but (by misconception) was being applied as "proof" of woods effects, etc. It is every subtle feature of the system's design and is intentional.

Close combats are fights at ranges closer than the nominal one hex. In concept, I always assume the troops to be able to be anywhere in a hex, and not riveted to the hex's center. Therefore, in close terrain, lines are as assumed to move toward the edges of the hex, in order to maintain the correct fire effect level--an assumed "normal" level of fire combat. In open areas, the range can be more effectively determined by the number of hexes involved -- since the base of the system is "one hex, open terrain."

Lastly, since further numeric study only served to confirm our original concepts, it is highty unlikely that a woods terrain effect will be added to the system (with Dave's variant idea of straggler adjustment aside.) One caller aimed to have a lead on examples where one force intentionally formed in and fought from woods against another which swept across the open in front of it.

OK, bring it on and we'll look at the statistics. I would like you all to bear in mind one point, however, if woods gave an advantage in defense which was noticeable, why are exampes of this kind so hard to come by? Civil War commanders were among the finest officers of their day and they would not only notice, but would go out of their way to take advantage of, any amount of edge they could get. We have a bad tendency to look down our 20th Century noses at their methods (March and fight in lines, standing up? Get real!) They knew what they were doing and what they were about. That they did not have the advantage of our hindsight should not be held against them. If the advantage of woods was perceived as less than the problem of managing troops in them, why should we corrupt the game system by giving players encouragement -- a reward -- for behaving in a way that is incorrect, ahistorical, and the opposite of the way their "onmap" commanders would have handled their troops?

The Illustrious Status Rule

Fact or Fiction?

by Dean N. Essig

The CWB's Status rule is a much maligned creature. Many a player has had a hard time with it, as the assessment of the relative 'goodness' of a turn is left in the eye of the beholder. I tried to limit the teeth gnashing in that decision by the table which converts status change viewpoint into status change (in an effort to water down the effect of the player's decision.) while heavily reliant on the player's maturity and honesty, it is workable for most.

In a review the entire status system was attacked on its unhistorical or just plain dumb" grounds. This, I believe, is an improper attack on the rule. We do not suggest that the enemy commander casts a "spell of impending gloom" on his opponent or in some way orders his opposite to run away. In an avoidance of a "gamey" point based army morale system with more rules than I'd like to think about, I opted to let the enemy player enforce Murphy's Law for the game system.

Thus, when a player sees his opponent on the ropes and verge of defeat, he inflicts a panic demand on him. With no rules at all, we have created a spotting mechanism for when it is the worst possible time to make a panic check -- the enemy player. As for unhistorical, I can point out the rout of three Union armies as examples of failed panic checks.

The alternative would be to create some sort of point based army morale which accumulates during the game (and the players would have to keep trac of), followed with some sort of triggering mechanism for army morale checks. The problem would be the trigger. The correct time for the morale check would have to be at the worst possible instant This instant would have to be defined in better terms than the one dimension of losses.

Such things as relative position of units, success or failure of operations, and the player's own attitude or mood would have to be evaluated. Army morale is a slippery thing as it is generally a feeling about the future, tends to be transmitted as rumor, and is a catastrophic failure or nothing result. Armies don't get "shaken" results.

Not for Everyone

The status rule is not for everyone. Certain players simply cannot admit the reality of their game situation. Others would rather lie than lose. If game victory is a very important subject to either yourself or your opponent then it would be best to leave army status alone. Certainly, the rule is not designed with the solitaire player in mind and would be very difficult to implement in such a situation (I usually drop it when playing solitaire.)

As with any of our rules, if you feel we are all wet, go ahead and change it. We won't mind and, after all, it is your game. It is my considered opinion that the rule is a correct one and reflects the historical situation with a limited number of rules. Feel free to disagree.

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Extended Movement

A Gambit for Tactical Surprise

by Dave Powell

One of the most common complaints about board games is that achieving true surprise over your opponent is impossible. After all, he's watching every move you make. Jackson's dramatic flank march at Chancellorsville is a waste of time, and what fool would go to the lengths Longstreet did at Gettysburg, just to avoid being seen?

The problem stems from the fact that even though you may have completely duped your opponent; once you stars movement -- with only six movement points -- you're hardly going to turn up in his flank before he issues corrective orders. He may have some trouble getting new instructions adopted, but in the end, its a good bet that at least somebody will show up to hold off your flanking column until the rest of his reserves arrive.

Of course, if you had 20 or 30 MP's to spend in one turn, you could put troops into column, slip around on an unguarded road, go back into line, and hit him a devastating rear attack -- all in one turn. Imagine the bellows of anguish tbat this would elicit from the other side of the map!

The basic thrust of this variant calls for a player to be able to issue orders to a force which allow the command in question to remain quietly in one place on the map -- seemingly inoffensive and meek. All the while, the force would actually be accumuluing movement points, a full allowance for each turn that goes by. Then, at the time of his choosing, the acting player could suddenly set this command in motion, expending all of its 'saved' MP's in one devastating turn. Of course, a number of rules will be set forth cocerning visibility, etc., and to provide for discovery.

In order to reap the beneflts of this rule, the player would need to observe the following restrictions:

> 1. The player must issue an order to a command that specifies the directed force as making a 'surprise move.' All elements affected by this order must be listed (say, all of I Corps plus attached) and a *detailed* route. Roads work best here, since they are easier to specify.

> 2. Once the order is accepted, the force cannot physically move or conduct

activities like straggler recovery or ammo resupply. They must remain in place in their formation. They may not conduct fire combat of any type.

3. Each Movement and Close Combat Phase Commencing with the phase immediately following order acceptance, the phasing player must roll a die each surprise moving force, and consult the MP Accumulation Table. The result will either be a pass -- indicating that all of the turn's MP's may be saved and used later -- or a fail -- which means the that the march has been discovered. At the beginning of any Movement and Close Combat Phase, the player may forego this die roll and elect to execute the march voluntarily, at which time the force resumes normal functioning -- the surprise order is then carried out in a normal turn by turn manner. This initial movement may continue until all accumulated MP's have been expended or until the lead element reaches a "blocked hex." (See below.)

Upon discovery, the force immediately moves along the indicated route until all accumulated MP's are expended or its lead element reaches a blocked hex -- exactly as if the player had voluntarily elected to execute the movement.

Conditions and Definitions

Concealed Movement

When the phasing player actually begins the movement of the surprise force -- either by choice or discovery -- he must follow his assigned route until either all the accumulated MP's have been expended or he reaches a blocked hex. A "blocked hex" is defined as any hex at or within two hexes of an enemy infantry, cavalry, or artillery unit.

Furthermore, a "blocked hex" is considered reached if the phasing player, while following his route, enters a hex that can be seen by an enemy unit or leader in keeping with standard LOS and current visibility. Once the blocked hex is reached, the moving player may move the surprise units 6 more MP's or the remainder of their accumulated MP's -- whichever is *less*. He may conduct close combat and normal fire combat.

Enemy Interference

If the enemy attacks any unit of a surprise force with artillery fire at five hexes or greater, the combat is resolved nommally, except that the defending player secretly ignores the result and does not record any straggler or casualty losses. Morale results are also ignored, but the defending player can mark his units with appropriate results (Sh, Dg, etc.) and execute any retreats to preserve the illusion.

Units may recover morale and return to their previous locations -- the only kind of movement allowed in exception to #1 above. When the owning player initiates his surprise move, simply remove any of these 'sham' markers and return units to their proper locations.

If the enemy attacks any surprise unit with units at four hexes or less, the surprise move is triggered. Additionally, any enemy combat unit (infantry, cavalry, or artillery) that ends its movement at or within two hexes of a surprise unit also triggers the order. This trigger is handled in the following manner

> 1. The surprise player informs his opponent that a surprise move has been triggered. Any attacks against surprise units are ignored, but enemy units may not pass through or move into hexes occuped by surprise units. They may fire through such hexes.

> 2. At the beginning of his Movement and Close Combat Phase, the surprise player immediately executes the surprise order subject to the following conditions:

>> A. He must follow the designated route. B. He may only expend 1/2 of his accumulated MP's. He may not expend the additional 6 MP's he would normally get for that turn. He may not stop short of expending 1/2 of his MP's unless he reaches a blocked hex -- in which case all movement ceases. All additional MP's over the 1/2 allowed are lost.

Voluntary Cancellation

A player may change a surprise force's order during a normal Command Phase by sending it new orders or by initiative. When sending new orders, arrival time is calculated by adding the expected amount of accumulated MP's to the actual distance to the force's HQ.

For example, if the 1st Corps HQ is 20 MP's away from the Army commander -- normal time delay would be two turns. However, Ist Corps has accumulated 12 MP's so another two turns must be expended to deliver the order -- for a total of 4 turns. Initiative requires no such time delay calculation.

Once the time delay has passed, the surprise force begins to check for acceptance normally. Until the new order is accepted, the surprise order must be followed. At any time during this stage, the player could still choose to implement the surprise order, but would continue to roll for the newly received one.

Once he has succeeded in changing his orders, the player has two options: He may execute the old surprise order as it has progressed so far, and then begin to execute the new order's instructions. Alternatively, he may reverse the order -- rolling on the

MP Accumulation Table to *subtract* MP's from the accumulated total in order to preserve secrecy. Once the total is zero, he could then start executing the new orders. If discovered, however, he would still have to immediately expend the accumulated MP's as described in Enemy Interference above.

Surprise Move Collision

It is possible, though unlikely, that both sides will attempt to use portions of the same route for a surprise move at the same time. In tbese cases, the players can either allow the player who started his move first to complete all of it and consider the other player's move cancelled with accumulated MP's lost. Or, both players can conduct a semi-imultaneous move in the following manner

1. Player A begins his move and indicates his route.

2. Player B checks for any overlap with bis own move, and if finding any, informs A.

3. A now moves his force 6 MP's.

4. B does the same.

5. Both players continue alternating this until either all MP's are expended (if one side has more accumulated, he may simply finish his move at the end of the alternation) or they come within 6 MP's of each other. At that point, both forces are done moving and the normal sequence of events resumes. Note that in this instance the non-phasing player actually moves his force during his opponent's phase. These units may not move again in their own following Movement and Close Combat Phase -- consider them already moved. The phasing player, however, may move freely in his next phase giving him a slight advantage, getting the jump on things so to speak.

Either method may be used as long as both players agree beforehand.

Initiative Use

In addition to the use of initiative to change or supercede an order, players may use their leaders to alter a specified route in order to avoid a blocked hex. If, as he expends his accumulated MP's, a player discovers he is about to enter a blocked hex he can have the ranking leader of the force (not a subordinate) roll for initiative to alter his route.

If successful, the player may deviate from the specified route in order to avoid the blocked hex. He must announce his intended detour route, and his detour must seek

to regain the speciffed route as rapidly as possible. Note that each avoidance of a blocked hex requires a separate initiative roll.

Failure to receive initiative means that the force enters the blocked hex and follows the procedure above. Note that changing the objctive or the orders as a whole via initiative would still need to be done in the normal Command phase not during this detour procedure. Only the route may be modified in this manner. As an added bonus, allow any force that is accompanied by at least one cavalry brigade to modify this detour initiative roll by +1 to the dice.

Forced Marches

Players may also add forced march MP's onto the accumulated MP total, up to the four max each turn, as per the normal rules. Of course stragglers should be checked for normally, but rolls should be made secretly to preserve the surprise. Note that even if a surprise move is cancelled and a unit is subtracting MP's, it still must make straggler checks if using forced marching.

Visibility Limits

A maximum visibility limit of 20 hexes is imposed. In the series, no visibility limits are set during clear weather as no unit can ever fire more than 10 hexes. Here, a special limit needs to be imposed as a limit to long range observation which would be hindered by woods, buildings, and brush too small to be printed on the map as well as the ever present haze. In situations where weather intrudes, games will specify other (shorter) maximum visibility limits.

General Comments

The above rule simulates wide flanking marches such as Longstreet's and Jackson's in an admittedly abstract manner. Yet, it adds a real measure of suspense. Suddenly, control of high ground like Little Round Top or Cemetery Hill becomes critical, providing vantage points to keep an eye on the other guys. Cavalry, with fast movement and more latitude in using divisional goals, will be used in their historical role by alert commanders -- to screen flanks and to cover hidden roads.

In order to prevent too much tedious plotting, I suggest specifying road routes whereever possible. In some instances, it may be necessary to list specific hexes to avoid disputes. Another clue would be to conduct approach movements at night, when visibility is nil and only the presence of enemy troops need be worried about.

The two hex radius of enemy forces represents the posted pickets of those units. These pickets would rarely be placed further than four hundred yards from their parent units. Again, this makes cavalry especially useful in screening flanks these

brigades serve as tripwires against enemy formations.

The table is provided to make surprise marches more difficult to achieve the greater the distance that is attempted. Hence, the longer the march, the more the risk of premature discovery, and subsequently the more separated and exposed to piecemeal destruction one's forces will be. While somewhat abstract, this increasing risk simulates some of the actual burden borne by commanders who attempted such actions, most notably Robert E. Lee.

Some players may feel that as long as they can see the enemy, how can he get up and leave? To a certain extent this is an abstraction, but also remember that a number of ruses were used to good effect during the war. Nathan Bedford Forrest once convinced a Union commander he was badly outgunned by having one artillery battery circle the same stand of trees repeatedly. That same Federal commander -- who was very inexperienced -- then asked Forrest's advice on whether he should surrender or not! All in all, if your enemy slips one over on you, simply chalk it up to the fortunes of war and drive on. Stranger things have happened.

MP Accumulation Table				
Roll	**# of Turn Being Attempted**			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4+**
1-3	P	P	P	P
4	P	P	P	F
5	P	P	F	F
6	P	F	F	F

-1 from die roll if during a full or partial night turn.
P = Pass F = Fail

Bloody 110th Umpired Game

The Rules

by Dean N. Essig

Umpired Bloody 110th--Intent

In April of this year, we gathered to play a prototype umpired game of *Bloody 110th.*. This article is a listing and explanation of the intent of that game, rules for it, if you will. The results of the game will be published in a later issue. A number of you have written asking for information and replays regarding umpired games. Others might be interested just to hear how one went, since solitaire play is most common. These articles are an effort to fill those needs.

Duties and Organization

The game presented here needs at least 5 players, we used more, but the minimum was 5. Of these players, one is the umpire/judge. His role and judgement is critical to the success of this type of game. The remaining players are divided into two teams of a minimum of two players each. One player per team is the off-map commander for the side, remaining players move counters on the map according to the off-map player's wishes.

In setting up our game, we placed experienced, fairly fast players on the map so as to keep the game flowing quickly enough to keep the off-map players awake. The duties of each player are listed below:

The Judge/Umpire

This person's ability and organizadon will make or break the game. His pur,oose is to handle the information flow to the two off-map players, control op sheets and their issue to the on-map players and generally keep things popping. Since the off-map players must determine the situation based onthe kind of reports they would get in real life, the judge must insure that an appropriate amount of screwed-up information is sent. The on-map players will generate some reports and requests, but theirs will tend to be both accurate and important. The judge must both interfere with the on-map players's communications and add useless informadon (which is coming from units not in contact -- such as requests for reinforcements, supplies, ermneous situation reports and the like.) The idea is to make the off-map players shift through

conflicting reports in order to make intuitive decisions on their accuracy. We have all seen this problem in the first days of the war with Iraq -- remember the first three weeks and the multiple incorrect, exaggerated and out and out mistaken reports?

When the on-map player makes a communication he scribbles it onto a scrap of paper. This paper is added to all others going to the off-map player in an "information period" (roughly 5 minutes) and is rolled for on the "Commo Table." We decided to use a table to inflict pain on the information process to avoid any conscious or subconscious bias. The Table is above ard uses a two die, dice roll.

Roll Result 11-24 Message Transmitted OK
25-26 Mildly Incorrect (wrong locations and times)
31-34 Exaggerations
35-36 Underestimates
41-44 Vague or incomplete
45-61 Strongly Incorrect
62-66 Message Not Transmitted, lost or not received.

I immediately decided that the table must be inflicted on all messages, including my own "noise," and that I should read the message to the receiver aloud (letting him take his own notes.) The latter not only keeps the player from getting clues from handwriting, but interjects a slight potential of additional (real) transmission error. Also, a rule should be that the message cannot be repeated (the judge must, of course, read slowly and carefully enough to not make it too tough!)

Actual communication between players on a team (on- to off-map, that is) should be strictly limited to this periodic exchange. Requests for specific data from the off-map players should be severely limited. Time delays should be inflicted. Messages should sometimes get to the off-map player after a period of up to 15 minutes. A further die roll per message is made every information period:

1-4 Deliver the message, Roll on the above table.
5-6 Postpone till next period.

This would act much like the delays in the CWB Series command rules -- giving each message a 67% chance of being delivered in a given period, 33% of being delayed till next time.

The second major job of the judge is to control the implementation of op sheets drawn up by the off-map player. He controls the entire implementation pmeess, giving weighted points, rolling on the table. The off-map player is allowed to give "preliminary instructions" on his op sh~eets, which the judge transposes to a message sheet, to bc delivered to the on-map player in the manner above. These instructions should be limited to: forces involved, assembly area (if any), start time (if any), and type of mission. The on- mapplayershould not tee told the objective of the mission or

its location, only that he is to do a defense, starting around 1300. He should not know ahead of time. The goal of this rule is to keep the player from starting the mission early using preliminary instructions as an excuse. "Well, I know I have to take hill 702 at 0900. I figured it would be easier to take if I was already on it..."

I decided not to distort the actual op sheets given by the off-map player. This was to avoid re-drawing all of them, or exerting even more confusion than reality. When implemented, the op sheet would simply be handed to the on-map player.

Organization of the umpire is the key to the enjoyment of the other players.

The Off-Map Players

These two guys are the "brains" of their forces. Their jobs include: the assessment of all reports coming in, preparing and submitting to the judge op sheets driving map play, deciding on the artillery fire missions to be fired, and maintaining a situation map. For our purposes, the off-map players are also to maintain a journal of their viewpoint for the production of the companion article to the game. The off-map situation map is a full size game map with a mylar cover. As the off-map player records situation reports, he draws/writes on the mylar with overhead markers. This map, of course, is posted on the wall.

The off-map player jots down his notes based on the umpire's oral messages, updates his situation map, plans fire missions (on-map players submit only hex grids and target descriptions infantry in open, tanks, etc. -- the off-map player must determine concentration type and number of battery fires to expend,) and makes any desired op sheet for implamentation. His most important task is to separate important from unimportant information and guide his force with a steady (not schizophrenic) hand. The judge must give him enough information (good and bogus) to keep him involved. Command communications -- Exactly WHY haven't you moved out yet.' -- are allowed but should be infrequent. These must be carefully controlled by the umpire to keep the on-map player from finding out too much.

The On-Map Players

It is up to these guys to keep the whole thing moving. Their jobs include moving counters, executing fires and combats, maintaining game functions, requesting fire missions, and following op sheets. They are tophy the game, and keep it rolling in real time or faster if possible. They prepare fire requests for the off-map player to decide upon. The more the merrier, since every map unit thinks the world revolves around it and it alone.

How it Should Work

Before the game begins, the two-player teams should be allowed time to get to know each other's work habits, level of aggression, need for detail, etc. A general, overall plan should be created by the off-map player and he and his on-map countepart should discuss it. When the game is to be set up, the off-map player must be cloistered away from the game map and the other off-map player (separate rooms if available, which is the way we did it.) The judge should set up a desk somewhere for his message and op sheet handling.

The on-map players set up their counters based on the game rules and their understanding of the off-map player's overall plan. The off-map player sets up his situation map using the game rules and his understanding of his overall plan. Note that the two players are not allowed to communicate exact set ups to each other, thus leaving the situation map incomplete and less precise tban a game map.

Game play begins. The on-map players begin following the sequence of play, omitting any segments run by the judge or off-map players. The draw up fire requests and situation reports, and give them to the judge. The judge draws up additional ones to add to the pooL

At the end of five minutes, the judge goes to his desk and rolls for ddivery of each message. Those being ddivered are checked for distortion. Messages in hand, he heads for first one off-map player, then the other, giving them the messages orally. They make notes, update their situation maps, and hand over any new op sheets or fire missions.

After both off-map playes have been briefed, the judge returns to the on-map players to check the current turn. If a new turn has started, he checks all op sheets on his desk for implementation. He checks any masages for the on-map playes for delivery and distortion, derives the same along with fire missions to be executed in the turn, and the process begins again.

While this is all going on, and the judge getting his workout, the on-map players are merrily pushing counters, resolving fire combats, morale checks, and drawing up artillery requests. The off-map playes spend their time sorting out conflicting reports, assigning artillery priorities, planning operations, and updating their maps according to their best guesses.

At the end of it, all have received the closest game to reality possible, and had fun, to boot!

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Storming Ashore

Recounting an Omaha Beach Playtest

by Dave Powell

In the last issue, I covered some of the various design aspects of Omaha in general terms. I thought it would also be interesting to view the thing from closer in. What follows is an infantryman's view of hitting the beach: a retelling of the last playtest done on the project.

For the final test drive, I decided to run through an historical scenario of the campaign game solitaire, playing to a clear conclusion or at least sometime on June 7th. I quickly set up the German troops (despite the game's size, few units actually start on the map) and drew out the initial US historical forces for the first wave. Then I rolled to see what leaders I would have for the Americans, and right away could tell it was going to be a long day at the beach. I only got three out of twelve possible: Taylor 16RCT, Bingham 2/116, and Williamson 2/18. These three men would lead my initial charges off the beach.

0640 6 June. The first wave hits. The fighting begins. German fire and high surf are rough on my DD tanks. Of the 32 attempting to land, only 5 survive. Happily, however, A/741st Tank Btn lands via LST's, and 10 of those 16 Shermans reach the Shingle. Losss are also fierce among the rest of the landing troops, with few platoons reaching coer without step loss.

For the next hour, the men of the 16th and 116th hug the shingle, while US tanks duel with pillboxes. German artillery missions begin to work over the landing sites. It is the begirming of a pounding destined to continue for a long time. Col. Taylor and Maj. Gingham are also ashore. American losses rise steadily, including several of the all-important tanks.

By 0740, the US forces ashore look downright puny. (Admittedly, the first wave is the smallest anyway.) So, the arrival of the second wave forges is a welcome relief. The heavy weapons companies arrive, bringing in AT guns to pin the battle against the pillboxes. The first artillery (Cannon/16 and the 7th FA) tries to land, but are mostly done in by their transport, the treacherous Dukws.

The first priority for the American is to knock out as many pillboxes as possible, in order to increase the survival odds of later landing forces, as well as start moving

inland. The landing pattern has radically scattered the arriving forces. Now the leaders become critical assets (fortunately they are hard to kill), sending infantry platoons over the shingle to begin the dangerous job of breaching the minefield and wire obstacles. With only three commanders, the US is limited to only a couple of breakthrough sites, which quickly become German artillery magnets.

The AT guns and the 4 artillery pieces that do get ashore now lend a hand in killing pillboxes, replacing the hard-hit tanks. Of the 15 tanks that made it ashore, less than half are left by 0840. The real punch is in the Artillery, who are especially effective in direct fire against the pillboxes. Unfonunately they run out of ammo (having lost most of it on the run in) too soon.

By 0900, the US forces are beginning to make some progress. Attrition among the German pillboxes has been heavy, aided by a less than perfect set-up on my part. I now discover that I have placed too many Gemman defenders on the west edge of the map, around St. Laurent, and now have 6 or 7 pillboxes who lend virtually nothing to the fight. This underscores the lesson of care in unit placement. Every German unit counts.

Still, US losses are severe, and no easy task lies ahead. In the hour before the landing of wave 3 at 0940, US troops are taking their first tentative steps inland, through the obstacle line. Here is where the critical leader shortage begins to pinch. I have managed two breaches, the first just east of the E-1 draw and the second around E-3. With only two leaders--Williamson (2/18) isn't in yet -- I'm forced to escort small clumps of units inland, and with each suppressed or paralyzed unit I am forced to chaose: halt the whole force or leave the laggards.

Finally, the third wave hits, bringing in fresh traops from the 18th RCT, as well as the 115th of the 29th Division. The beaches are less dangerous ww, as German artillery shifts to the more immediately dangerous inland drives. The fresh infantry is desperately needed, as almost all five battalions of the 16th and 116th have had over 50% losses, with some battalions even worse off.

The first German reinforcements (exclusive of artillery releases) now appear -- I rolled and got the l/915th Bn. They enter at the south map edge, center, and begin working on a counterattack order. In the meantime, two on-map infantry companies of the 916th start a tentative counterattack against the E-1 breach. Soon battles are raging for Le Brag and the approaches to St. Laurent. Most of the German reserves remain uncommitted, however, as I have not had great dice rolls.

By 1100 hours, two US reinforcement waves have landed, the beach is getting crowded, and new problems are popping up. Firstly, at noon the US leaders will go away, thus leaving numerous US troops inland without orders. Even a mod$rately effective German counterattack will send these troops scurrying back to the beach aftertwo turns. Secondly, getting orders is a slow process. The US command prep

rating for June 6tb is 5, and when the size modifier for a full battalion is used, it is obvious that it is going to take awhile for my fresh battalions to get off their duffs. I'm limited to only 10 active US op sheets (which reflects the command assets ashore) and am now forced to use some of these on company sized forces. Two or three line companies must rush inland to take up defensive positions in order to hold off the German arrivals while the rest of the American behemoth languishes on the sideline.

The midday period follows the following odd course. G/2/16 holds off 1/915 for several turns, but suffers almost complete extinction -- by noon orly two steps of infantry of the original 15. US airpower is often present, but at least half the time it is in the hands of the German player, and so is kept at a distance. Still, the A-20's do get to savage the German mortar units, who quickly scramble for hard cover. Colleville is held by 2/16 and 1/116, both without orders. 2/18 and 3/16 are in firm possession of Le Brag -- 2/916 is pretty shot up by now -- but also is without orders.

On the beach, strong concentrations of AT guns, newly landed tanks -- by now, all the DD tanks are gone -- and some fresh artillery do further damage to pill boxes, and, by 1300, only the strong defense group north of St. Laurent remains. The scattered German squads and MG units are no real threat.

Early afternoon brings a lull to the fighting. More US troops get Op Sheetts for hasty defense which halt the German attacks. Once the possibility of triggering a "No-Orders" stampede back to the sea is removed, German attacks are suicide exercises. Therefore, I trigger some failure instructions and start working on area defense Op Sheets. Another German arrival, the Pioneers of the 352nd Division arrive on the west edge and start digging in near Formigny. Other remnants of the beach defenders and 2/916 hole up in St. Laurent. Initially, German artillery stops firing, since I can no longer place effective observed fire on the beach and inland Americans are defending in towns and woods.

Without good targets, I choose to hold the rounds in order to blunt future US attacks. Since turn one, I've run at least two fire missions every turn. *[Better let those tubes cool, Dave. -- Ed.]* No wonder there's so many US losses.

Finally, as the aftemoon slides into evening inkily, daylight lasts until 2200 hours, so there's still plenty of light -- some offensive action begins. 3/116 mops up the east end, clearing tine last few pill boxes from their beachfront positions. The bulk of the 18 RCT begins to accomplish the same task westwards, driving through St. Laurent. None of these actions brings on serious fighting, however, since the Germans need to conserve their limited strength for a tenacious defense further inland. By the end of June 6th, the Americans own all of the first two maps, exclusive of the still strong enclave around Les Moulins.

Throughout the night, US troops and artillery continue to land, including the fresh

strength of the 26th RCT and the entire 745th Tank Battalion. Since the Germans have been much less successful in their own reinforcement efforts, June 7th promises to be a day ripe with Allied successes.

I chose to end this playtest as June 7th was dawning, since I managed to accomplish my primary goal--a close look at the landing stage itself. The Americans got ashore in strength, of course, especially since the German reinforcement rolls were so urlucky. Still, the US lost heavily, and by dark on June 6th, over 100 American units had been eliminated outright.

Overall, I was very happy with the results of the test, and had fun to boot--not always the case when playtesting. I think gamers will find *Omaha* to be rich in tactical detail, and a puzzle solving effort for both sides -- unhindered by the size of the thing.

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Operational Combat Series

A First Peek

by Dean N. Essig

The OCS started to be designed in earnest in the summer of 1988. I ran through every imaginable system, standard stuff, capability points, assorted sequencing methods, and a bunch of ideas I'd care to forget. The evolution of the current set of rules was long and tedious -- a process that both allowed me to re-examine many gaming concepts and their relationship to actual historical occurrence (a self-education that would not be wasted on a few of my fellow designers...)

The result is the rules which are now undergoing a dress rehearsal playtest using our test- bed North Africa game. The draft underwent extensive playtesting in the last year or so which allowed the game to be stripped down to its essence, refined, and checked for errors. The process also calibrated the games charts and tables, so that they would provide historically accurate results.

An Overview -- The Major Ideas in the System

The OCS presents a number of interrelated concepts which attempt to recreate combat as a coherent whole, these Modes, Combat Chits, Surprise, and Supply. I'll examine each in turn, but first I want to emphasize that this game is moderately complex and gives an accurate rendition of operational combat If you want something very simple and abstract, it would be best to look elsewhere...

Modes

A tradition, of sorts, here is our innovative command rules. This game system, at first glance, has none. If you feel cheated, look again -- they are there, built into the game for you, no writing required! I determined early on that our standand method of command-orders specifying actions to be conducted in the future was not needed here. Given the ground, unit and time scales (5 miles per hex, Battalions and up, 1 week per player turn) the ability to switch from one operation or set of objectives to another need not be planned so far ahead. What was needed was a method of determining the overall operational posture of units, a posture the player would select and then have to live with for all or part of the turn. Modes were the system of choice. Six modes are available, of which the player can choose four (the remaining two are "inflicted" on the player as a result of combat.) These are: Combat, Move,

Strategic Move, and Reserve Modes. Combat and Move modes are almost identical in that they can move, fight, overrun, but have differing combat and movement values. The difference between the two is that in combat mode the unit is more deployed for combat than movement, and move mode is the opposite. Units in Strategic Move Mode are incapable of attack, but are able to move at two-times their movement allowance and are restricted to roads. Reserve Mode units are able to move some during regular movement, but, more importantly, are able to be "released" in the Reaction and Exploitation Phases in order to react to momentary opportunities or to assist defenses by counterattacking or reinforcing trouble spots. How a player controls his modes will either put him in the right position to take advantage of what happens or not -- based completely on his skill.

The two modes which a player has little control over are Exploitation and Disorganized Modes -- the good and the bad that come out of combat.

Combat Chits

In addition to modes, the Combat Chit selection process (as wellas supply, below) is a part of the command command system in the game. Before each attack is resolved, bath players choose one combat chit and this choice detennines how hard their units fight and the actual combat result. The attacker from "At All Cost" "Normal," and "Diversion" and the defender chooses from "Last Man, Last Bullet," Normal," and "Screen." These allow the players to influence the shape of the battle in the same way as real commanders -- you feed the battle with the resources you have and tell them how hard you demand they try -- with the results of greatness and disaster based on the choices made. There is also a random combat chit selector for use when playing solitaire -- which chooses the defender's combat chit for you based on the odds of the battle.

Surprise

A basic law of actual battle is that surprise is much more important than numbers in determining victory. If one side has it, it will probably win. A corollary of that is that the better the unit, the more likely it will gain surprise over enemy forces worse than itself. In the OCS, the most important number on the counter is the Action Rating, not the combat factor. Action ratings run from 0 (the pits) to 5 (outstanding.) Even when surprise is not obtained the Action rating differentce acts as a dice roll modifier in combat, so that better troops have better chances of doing weli than poor ones at the same odds level.

Surprise (while critically important is still an optional rule) is obtained by a dice roll before the combat is resolved, using the Action Rating differential as a dice roll modifier. Both the attacker and defender have a chanoe of obtaining surprise. When obtained by one side or the other, surprise is inflicted as a number of column shifts one way or the other depending on who has surprise equal to a single die -- thu is, up

to a SIX column shift! When I say its more important than numbers, I mean it.

Supply

Logistical preparadon of operations is the absolute key to victory, period. That is a basic fact in real life, but is almost ignored in wargames. I wanted a supply system that foHowed a few simple principles of logistics and one of playability -- it must provide: the consumption of supply through time based on unit size and type; the atility to andgile for the future; the degradation of ability due to distance; and a minimal amount of bookkeeping.

I think we have succeeded in all respects. Starting with an originally unwieldy system, playtesting gradually pared it down to its bare guts in which any further "improvement" would eliminue one or more of the desired principles. It requires no paperwork.

Players simply move supply points about using trucks, trains, ships, and wagons to the places they think they will need them. Again, this is the command system in acttion -- you can't divert your attack simply by moving the unit rapidly down the road -- the logistical support you put in the wrong place must also be relocated (with the reverse being true if you planned properly...)

Once within range of units or their HQ's, the units can expend them in a weekly overphase food, clothing, office supplies, and gas needed to keep the units running -- and during combat operatioos -- ammunition, medical supplies, more gas. Supply points represent 1500 tons of assorted stuff (no multiple supply types to juggle - assume the unit staffs are competent enough to send forward the right kind of supply, even though this isn't always the case.) Players expend supply during the overphase and in each combat.

Mechanically the system is very simple once players get used to it. And, I think, it adds greatly to the game's simulation without a corresponding over-subtraction of playability.

A Summation

The system operates using a weekly overphase followed by two idendcal half week player-turns. Therefore the game's supply functions (other than combat) are handled after every two complete turns which as a by-product adequately simulates the amount of stores carried with the unit as it funcdons. Player-turns are basically divided into: Movement, Reaction, Combat, and Exploitation phases. Overrun and some Barrage combats may occur in any of these phases, which gives the player able to properly utilize his army an enormous edge overone who can't.

Aircraft are on-map units which may fly out from their bases to be "on station" and

provide interdiction capabilides or may fly from base to a target to deliver a ground support strike. Air activity is allowed in most game phases which keeps it fluid and active -- as air power should be. The air units represent 45 aircraft (transports somewhat more.) Air to air combat is handled on a unit vs. unit manner using the differential between the aircraft until the hex is owned by one side or the other.

Keep in mind this is an intense simulation. It involves no required paperwork and can be played fairly quickly, but it is a fairly complex beast. It was designed to give the player a deep challenge, one that requires a fair amount of sweat in planning ahead and making your army work the way you want. Like real life, your gaming army will not magically fall into place with the right logistical requirements -- I guarantee it!

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Map Design

Of Background Colors and Contour Lines

by Dean N. Essig

A feature that confuses some gamers in TCS games is the use of contour lines for elevation detemination. Since these players have been trained bg other games (and not mal maps) the tendency to try to determine the elevation of a hex as "falling to the next lower contour line" makes itself apparert. This creates the layer cake form of terrain games have taught some to expect. The problem is that TCS games were not designed to be interpreted in that manner and this leads to problems like "what elevation is it if the line goes through the middle of the hex?"

Contour lines in our games, as in real topographic maps, show the exact elevation for points along that line. Elevations between lines are assumed to progress smoothly through the contour interval until the next line where they are equal to it. Hexes are assumed to have the elevation from an imaginary center dot. Therefore, a hex with the line going directly thmugh the center is the easiest case -- read the number along that line and you have it.

For cases falling between two lines of different elevation, one must determine a rough proportion of the distance from one line to the other used by the hex in question and then add the appropriate amount to the lower of the two contour line values. Most of the time the actual determination of a hex's elevation is unneeded -- but that is how it is done if you want to be exact.

For hexes falling between two lines of the same elevation (as on top of a hill or in a valley) merely add (hill) or subtract (valley) 1/2 of the contour interval from the last available contourlinc. Guesstimating thc crests of hills and ridges is not hard after you get used to judging quick proportions of distance from one set of lines to another. If all else fails, trace a line across the center of the hill or ridge in question perpendicular to your LOS -- if your unit is on the enemy side of the line the LOS is not blocked, if the line falls between your unit and his, the LOS is blocked.

Coloration

A feature of all our tactical games (those requiring an LOS) is a coloration of the hexes to help indicate elevation. The CWB games use a hex color code system for devation which is very similar to that found in many other games. What does confuse

some is ow method of color coding (which has changed somewhat with *Barren Victory*, more on that later in this article) in which lower devations appear darker than higher ones.

This is based on some fairly standard cartographic concepts which were either ignored or unknown to earlier game-mapmakers. Everyone used to "dark is up," so now maps took some by surprise -- we had violated a law! No, actually, the earlier maps were incorrect. Cartographers have kept to a "dark is down" concept for years. Why? Basically, both the appearance of aerial photographs and human eye perception follow this color scheme. From above, valleys are darker than surrounding hills because the lower levels have a higher concentration of moisture. The human eye perceives dark things as further from the observer, therefore if dark is down it is more natural to the eye's perception.

So why the change in Barren Victory? Actually, what you are seeing is a perceived change, not an actual one. The above concept still holds in my map making. What changed was that our computer based map production allowed more freedom than ever in color selection. Barren Victory's maps make use of a color hue change as well as simple darkness in order to show devation. Thus, you still have dark valleys but as you go up you transition to tans, browns, reds, etc.

Prior to that map, we were constrained to variations in two colors (yellow and blue) to generate the levels we needed. Those maps followed a succession of tones of each from 0 to 30 percent Blue and 0 to 100 to 10 percent Yellow in a bewildering number of separate over1ays. Not only was this process clumsy and expensive, it limited rather severely the number of levels possible.

When a map required a large number of levels (like *Thunder at the Crossroads*) I had to resort to tones which became too-close-to-call in difference or, gasp, my "light red" which I was reminded later was another term for pink! Just another bad spasm. with the computer, we are free from that menace but subject to numerous other traps...

In the TCS maps another technique was used (also to be altered with the "computer-based freedom" with the *Omaha* maps.) Those were color coded to help identify the features given by the contour lines, only. The colors on those maps are not designed to determine exact elevation-- that's what the contow lines are for. The colors exist to help the map stay away from that devil of contour lines the spaghetti map. Without a color system of some sort contour maps devolve into a mess of spaghetti like lines with little rhyme or reason until the player spends a few hours studying them. Ask any infantry Second Lt who had no prior service before commissioning... So, I added to color coding to help out, but not to solve the puzzle.

In the *Omaha* maps, I will be grouping devations by color so as to not kill the computer with excessive data (maps our size ride right on the line of what is possible

to do as it is, no need push it and risk total failure) and 2. take advantage of the lay of the ground and colors available to make it work well.

Those maps can easily be divided into three wnes for color purposes: the beaches, the bluffs overlooking the beaches, and the inland areas. The beaches are basically flat and can be handled in one color -- sand. The bluffs include a large elevation change over a very short distance and it would be wasteful to show this in more than two colors. The inland areas are fairly flat, but what devation change that exists is important, so I'll give one color per deviation there.

I hope the above was useful to at least some of you. If you can think of anything else you would like this sort of "behind the scenes" look at, please let me know.

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To Close Combat or Not

Game Strategy

by Dean Essig

One of the trickiest, alluring, and potentially self-destructive questions in the CWB and to some lesser extent in the TCS is when to close that final distance with the enemy -- to close combat or assault the enemy units own hex. While I cannot give any analytical, statistical formula for this determination (I'll leave that to others who might be so inclined, who will remain nameless, Rod), I can give some guidanoe on when I think its a good idea and when I think it isn't.

As a caveat, I play my game from the hip usually -- which means I'm usuallly not interested in squeezing that last little bit of performance out of my units and that I'll accept what amounts to a higher order of both risk and mistakes simply because I play by "feel" and not in a highly calculating manner. So, with that in mind, you can take or leave what I have to say as it suits you and your style of play.

Generating close combats (in this article, I'll address the CWB specifically, and TCS only by your own transposition of concepts, for the sake of simplicity) is as close to an act of desperation as you can come in our games. I'll initiate a close combat only as the *coup de grace* to a stricken unit or as a final level of punch toward the end of an assault. It is not the approved manner of attack in general. Conditions must be mainly correct or a close combat will entail needless levels of loss at a highly exaggerated rate.

In our games, troop conservation is a high priority -- players who run up huge butcher's bills and compare the system's tables are out of whack take note: unlike in most games, the player must take an active part in conserving his army for the long term battle. The system gives historical results when used historically, period. Since close combat goes against the grain of troop conservation, it must be looked upon as a specialized event used for effect in certain situadons, not as a line softening device!

Used incorrectly, close combat can cripple large formations in a very short penod of dme. For instance, in a playtest game of *In Their Quiet Fields* (a long time ago, I'll admit), yours truly pounded one Confederate brigade stacked with guns with the Union 2nt Corps. In the course of one turn's attack, 2nd Corps launched repeated assaults against that one hex and, in the process, eliminated itself as a viable force. The *entire* corps, that is. The hex, of course, wasn't taken. Used correctly, as by Tom

Watson in our Spring Retreat game of Pipe Creek (albeit with a great degree of luck) such assaults can rupture the enemy line and send him flying back. As a caveat to Tom's assault, while in one or two instances it was very successful, in other cases it wasn't, the net result was a near-victory and a bloody stalemate with some 8,000 casualties in Longstreet's reinforced Corps but that is a long story...

Conditions

The conditions needed for good close combat usage involve the units on either side and the potential events after the attack. The attacking units must be B morale or better with a good leader (unless they are bloodlusted in which case it doesn't matter.) Strengths of above average to be preferred with enough buffer such that no matter what happens in the fire combat, the unit will skill do well on the Odd's Table.

Obviously, line formation is a must. I would stay away from assaulting with units which have extended lines (wasteful and clumsy.) Units from wrecked divisions or ones which are wrecked themselves should never close combat as attackers. In the 2nd Edition rules, wrecked units are expressly forbidden from attacking.

The target should be in as bad a condition as possible -- DG or Routed, no leader, no cannons, as weak as you can estimate their strength or in some formation (column comes to mind) in which they are helpless. There is no chivalry in close combats. Pound the weak and the sick. Hit 'em while they are down -- the harder the better. Never expend a close combat on someone who can put in a decent fight -- always aim at those whom you can slam on the floor witwut too much effort or drain on the attackers. It's not a pretty sight, but kicking the enemy when he's down is half the fun, isn't it?

Terrain such as trenches, sunken roads and the like should be avoided unless the enemy gives you a nice juicy target like limbered guns or infantry in column (or that greatest of all targets -- mounted cavalry!)

A word about guns as targets limbered ones are easy and fun to kick around, unlimbered ones, unless taken in the flank, are very painful but can be productive if, and only if, they are unsupported by infantry in line. Gun units are pretty fragile and cannot take much in the way of lumps if you get at them uncovered -- when you get the chance go in and tear them up, if you get to the Odds Table you almost can't lose!

The player must look ahead to the future when executing these attacks. A failure to do so may very well end a fun turn of slamming the sick and weak with a disaster. This is especially true in the 2nd Edition rules where the "turn to meet 'em option" has been removed. Before defenders could readjust their facing if the attacker had to do so in order to get at them. This is no longer the case. Now, if you squirm into his line in a one hex breach, one or the other of the adjacent units will be able to close combat your flank in the coming phases. You must breach at least a two hex wide

hole in his line to avoid this unhappy situation.

Exploiting a close combat created situation must be handled with great care. Once you've blown that nice hole in his line, pouring through with every available unit may not be the best plan. Pounding the flanks of the hole (the expanding torrent, B. H. Liddell Hart) may or may not be either. It was in pounding open the flanks of a breach in which Tom's attack above lost some of its initial great success.

It may be best to pull back, form a good firing line studded with artillery, and let him try to reoccupy. I can't give much advice on how to choose between the above options as it is so heavily dependent on the local situation, your orders, and your manner of play. I can say that if the initial success can be attributed to a great dice roll (in combat or morale) chances are it isn't going to be productive to leap into the gap or try and expand it. If, however, it was due to a wrecked unit and you think that others nearby might be or become wrecked (or are in any of the above juicy categories) go for it.

With all the cautions above, I'm afraid I might make you be too tentative about making close combats. I can only follow by giving you the advice not to putter around with your attacks -- if you are going to attack, then ATTACK like you mean it -- as U.S. Grant said "Hit him as hard as you can, as often as you can, and keep moving on." Limp, halfhearted attacks in this game system do not cut it -- they needlessly remove the fighting edge of the attacking troops with little or no gain.

If you are going to do it, then by all means do it, but if you're not sure make a decision -- attack all-out to see if it works, or don't attack at all. And, as a last word, its always best to let your opponent to attack you in the place of your choosing -- a strong line in good terrain heavily studded with cannon. Let him pay the butcher's bill, so you don't have to. When he's crippled himself, he won't be able to stand your attack in the second half of the game...

Blitzkrieg

Myth of the Blitz

by Capt. Thomas T. Smith
Infantry: Jul-Aug 1990

Anyone who stands on "The Whale" at the National Training Center, or "Antelope Mound" at Fort Hood, or "Old Baldy" at Hohenfels in Germany will probably soon see an M1 tank or M2 Bradley platoon roaring by in a 40-mile-per-hour charge and a boil of dust.

This is what we in the combat arms like to think of as displaying an aggressive spirit, always in the best tradition of Rommel or Patton. The fact that this offensive spirit translates into great speed in miles per hour is an unfortunate misconception of past events.

Our concepts of the rapid pace of armor operations are firmly rooted incertain assumptions we make about the historical legacy of previous events. Jackson in the Valley, Stuart's ride, Sherman's march, Guderian's blitzkrieg, and other legendary episodes shape our maneuverthinking and sometimes drive us ever forward, ever faster.

But in those past operations, how fast was fast? Blitzkrieg (or"lightning war") is a term that conjures up the very image of speed. But what did blitzkrieg really amount to in miles per hour or per day? An examination and comparison of the estimated pace or rate of advance of a selected series of battles, campaigns, or specific operations may be surprising and may challenge our concept of the speed of past military operations.

The examples I have chosen are well known to military professionals, and were certainly not the run-of-the-mill kind. I selected them because they are outstanding examples of the use of maneuver and movement to pin an objective.

Except when noted, the average mile per hour figure was obtained by dividing the average daily advance by 12 hours, a compromise figure based on the infrequency of night operations for mechanized or armored forces as well as the need for maintenance, resupply, and sleep. No variables or coefficients were used to account for weather, terrain, enemy strength, or other factors. All of the operations were executed, however, under the general conditions of a movement to contact.

Since dismounted infantry should represent the slowest rate of advance, the first two examples are of marching infantry from the U.S. Civil War. These provide a standard base for the others.

Civil War

After a number of diversionary moves and zigzag feints, Confederate Lieutenant Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson with 17,000 of his quick-marching "foot cavalry" invaded the Shenandoah Valley in the summer of 1862. His command fought five battles from McDowell on 8 May to Port Republic on 9 June, and marched 260 miles. Jackson's movement averaged 8.6miles (13.7 kilometers) per day, 0.7 miles per hour.

Major General William T. Sherman, in the 25 days between 15 November and 10 December 1864, led 62,000 Union soldiers in his march of 250 miles from Atlanta to the sea at Savanah. Sherman averaged 10 miles (16 kilometers) per day, 0.8 miles per hour.

The Civil war and frontier cavalry provide four more examples of rates of movement.

During the Peninsular Campaign, Confederate Gen. J. E. B. Stuart made his reconnaissance ride around Major General George B. McClellan's Army of the Potomac. Stuart and his 1,200 horse soldiers left Richmond on 12 June 1862 and covered 95 miles in three days. They averaged 31.6 miles (50.5 kilometers) per day, 2.6 miles per hour.

Between 17 April and 2 May 1863, Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson led 1,700 Union cavalry on a raid from Grand Junction, Tennessee, to Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The brigade rode 600 miles in 16 days, averaging 37 5 Miles (60 kilometers) per day at 3.1 miles per hour.

In 1873, Colonel Ronald S. Mackenzie led 400 men of his 4th Cavalry on a raid from near Fon Clark, Texas, across the Rio Grande to Remolino, Mexico. From 17 to 19 May, MacKenzie's command remained in the saddle for the 140-mile round trip to attack a village of Kickapoo Indians who had been using Mexico as a sanctuary after their depredations. His average was 70 miles per day (112 kilometers) and (since they rode 24 hours a day) 2.9 miles per hour.

Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer and the 7th Cavalry left Fort Abraham Lincoln, Dakota Territory, on 17 May 1876 and arrived at the Little Bighorn River on 29 June after riding 320 miles in 41 days. Their average speed was 7.8 miles (12.4 kilometers) per day, 0.6 miles per hour.

WWII

An examination of modern Mechanized maneuver begins with German General Heinz Guderian, the principal architect of the operational aspects of blitzrieg.

In the original blitzkrieg -- the first 14 days of the invasion of Poland, 1-14 September 1939 -- Guderian's XDC Corps of panzers and motorized infantry traveled 325 miles from their attack position to Brest-Litovsk, Poland, an average of 23.2 miles per day (37.1 kilometers), 1.9 miles per hour.

During the invasion of Franoe, 10-23 May 1940, Guderian's III Corps traveled 255 miles from the German border to Calais. Although their best day was 56 miles, their average daily rate was 19.6 miles (31.3 kilometers), 1.6 miles per hour.

Gen. Erwin Rommel's campaign in the desert of North Africa offers another four examples. I have also included as an example the British pursuit of Rommel's retreating forces:

His first major offensive across Libya, launched on 24 March 1941 at El Agheila, drove 320 miles to Tobruk, arriving on 10 April. In 18 days the German 5th Light and 15th Panzer Divisions averaged 17.7 Miles (28.3 kilometers) per day, 1.4 miles per hour. (The 5th Light Division later became the 21st Panzer Division.)

When he was eventually driven back to the border, Rommel launched a second offensive over the same ground in 1942. From El Agheila to the Gazala line, the Africa Corps covered 350 miles between 21 January and 4 February 1942. This was an average of 23.3 Miles (37.2 kilometers) per day, 1.9 miles per hour.

Between 26 March and 2 June 1942, Rommel conducted his end run around the Gazala-Bir Hacheim Line. From their laager to the beginning of the Cauldron battles, the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions traveled about 60 miles in 8 days for a daily average of 7.5 miles (12 kilomaers), or 0.6 miles per hour.

In the Battle of Alam Halfa Ridge, Rommel's 15th Panzer traveled 30 miles on 31 August and 1 September 1942. Their average was 10 miles (16 kilometers)per day, 0.8 miles per hour.

I think the limits of this sample, Rommel's offensive operations in Africa averaged 14.6 miles per day, or 1.1 miles per hour.

After Rommel's defeat at El Alamein, his retreating forces were pursued 1,400 miles to Tunisia by Lieutenant General Bernard L. Montgomery's British Eighth Army. This pursuit, slowed by skillful German delaying actions, lasted from November 1942 to February 1943, about 90 days. Montgomery's command averaged 15.5 miles (24.8 kilometers) per day, 1.3 miles per hour.

On the U.S. side, I put forth the following examples:

In July 1943, as part of LtGeneral George S. Patton's U.S. Seventh Army during the invasion of Sirily, the 2d U.S. Armored Division attacked from Gela to Palermo in 5 days. At the same time, the 3rd U.S. Infantry Division attacked from Agrigento to Palermo. These divisions averaged 20 miles (321 kilometers) per day, 1 .6 miles per hour.

In France during the St. Lo breakthuough operations, the 4th and 6th U.S. Armored Divisions were elements of Major General Troy Middleton's VIII U.S. Corps. During the period 25-31 July 1944, the VIII Corps advanced 40 miles for an average of 5.7 miles (9.1 kilometers) per day, 0.4 miles per hour.

These two divisions became part of Patton's forces when his U.S. Third Army became operations on 1 Aug 1944. During the breakout phase, the 6th Armored drove from Avranches to Brest, 180 miles in 7 days. The 4th armored Division advanced from Avranches to Nantes, 160 miles 1-13 August, a daily average of 12.3 miles (19.6 kilometers), 1 mile per hour.

October 1973 War

A final example of a relatively rapid armor rate of advance comes from the October 1973 Mideast war.

After a 30-hour armor battle, Israli Mapr General Avraham Adan's armored division crossed the Suez Canal on a pontoon bridge near Deversoir the night of 17-18 October 1973. With other forces, Adan's division attacked south against Egyptian mechanized infantry and tank forces and reached Suez on 23 October, trapping the Egyptian Third Army. This attack averaged 7.5 miles (12 kilometers) per day, 0.6 Mph.

Rates

From this limited survey, the following rates of advance have been calculated for better-than-average units and leaders:

The Civil War infantry in this survey averaged 9.3 miles (14.8 kilometers) per day, 0.8 miles per hour.

The raiding cavalry had the highest averages of the survey -- 36.7 miles (58.7 kilometers) per day, 2.3 miles per hour.

The average for the armor/mechanized/motorized infantry advances is 14.9 miles (23.8 kilometers), 1.1 miles per hour.

The rate of advance for an armored force is always limited, of course, by its appetite for fuel and ammunition and by the speed at which these commodities can be transported. The German armored blitzkrieg in Russia, for example, had one-half million horses in its supply column. In the absence of a road network or deep mud, the animals often proved more efficient than wheels.

None of these examples of armored force advances produced an average speed of more than 2 miles per bour. Long advances are a product of steady momentum and perseverance rather than dash. This is not to suggest that the mobility and speed of armored vehicles are not important to operations. Armor battles have brief opportunities that can be seized only by a burst of speed or a bold assault.

Certainly, the dash speed between firing positions gives a vehicle an important element of protection, and also allows it to seek cover rapidly or the even evade enemy fire. Vehicle speed also allows commanders to shift forces rapidly during a battle. As the evidence in this study suggests, however, our historical models such and Guderian, Rommel, and Patton did not use the potential speed of their forces to sacrifice security or to rush blindly into uncertain situations.

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The Use of Breastworks

American Civil War

by Dave Powell

Armies, both North and South, may have entered the Civil War with a naive attachment to the tactical precepts of a bygone era, but they definitely emerged with a firm grounding in warfare's harshly dictated realities. The lessons were dearly bought. Still, the open, bloody fields of '61 and '62 did finally give way to the eartworks of the late war -- as both sides took to the ground for survival.

This evolution from open fields to trench warfare is worth examining, especially in the context of gaming. The increasing use of field fortifications throughout the war represents the sector of greatest tactical evolution, and hence is also the most difficult area to successfully create in a game series purporting to simulate the whole war.

Opinions were always mixed concerning the use of field defenses, with some commanders insisting that such works deny their troops of some "offensive spirit" and encourage cowardice. To further aggravate the problem, even the definition of the word "breastworks" changed as time went on. Early on, fences, piled logs, or even piles of felled brush might be referred to as breastworks in regimental commander's reports.

By late 1864, both sides were digging elaborate trench systems with firing steps, head protection, and support trenches -- all forming lines studded every few hundred yards with fully developed artillery bastions. In between these extremes, troops adapted to the newer conditions of warfare with varying degrees of reluctance.

Antietam was probably the last eastern battle in which virtually no effort was made by the troops to provide themselves with improved positions -- not insignificantly, the battle was also the bloodiest single day of battle in American history. To be sure, the Rebels used the Bloody Lane, but that was a naturally occurring feature. Even the "rifle pits" employed by Toombs' Georgians on the bluff above Burndde's Bridge were more depressions in the mucky soil, augmented slightly, than any real defensive works.

Three months later at Fredericksburg, Longstreet's powerfully strengthened the Marye's Heights position, most notably by digging a trench behind the famous Stone Wall, creating a five-foot bulwar to fire from. Thirteen separate Union assaults faced

against this line, with a staggeringly disproportionate loss ratio of attackers to defenders. The Union troops took notice, and, by the next May at Chancellorsville, a number of Union units could be found erecting defensive works -- mostly of the felled tree and piled brush variety.

Confederate defenses continued to develop as well -- when Lee moved on Hooker, he left Jubal Early to defend a heavily fortified line. In what became known as Second Fredericksburg, Union forces attacked this line and took it -- mainly because the small Rebel force was spread out over a great distance.

Gettysburg

Gettysburg, because of the voluminous writing it generated, provides a wealth of data about almost every aspect of the war -- breastworks included. The Confederates make little mention of any works being built there. This is of little surprise since they were on the attack all three days. The Union provides interesting glimpes at the diversity of effort being applied at the time.

On the night of July 1st, John Geary (commander Second Division, 12tb Corps) told his officers that he was adverse to building rifle pits because "it unfitted men to fighting without them." In reply, the Third Brigade commander, George Greene, said that "The saving of life was of far more consequence to him than any theories as to breastworks...and [his men] would have them if they had time to build them."

As a result, the men on Culp's Hill erected quite strong breastworks -- much to the dread and annoyance to Rebels listening to the ring of axes all through the night.

The very focal point of Pickett's Charge provides further illustration. Holding the line at the famous 'Clump of Trees' was Webb's Brigade (2/2/2) and speciflcally the 69th PA. The 64th placed itself behind a low stone wall directly in front of the Rebel objective.

They made very little effort to improve the two-foot high wall, augmenting it with only a few fence rails. No digging was done at all. Even the first rank, kneeling, was exposed from the waist up. The second rank, standing, was even more exposed. The wall certainly provided an easily defined rally point, and used as a guide to dress the battle line, but had only a limited effect in stopping enemy fire.

A few hunderd feet to the south, Hall's Brigade (3/2/2) strengthened their positions by digging. They too were placed behind low stone walls with added fence rails, but they also piled up dirt with whatever utensils came to hand. Unfortunately, shovels and picks were not available, and no doubt this lack of tools also contributed to the haphazard nature of the Union defenses.

The tool problem was soon to be corrected, as more commanders cast aside

impractical notions like Geary's for the very real protective benefits of earth-works. By the time of Mine Run (fall, '63), both armies were digging in quite extensively and digging tools were making their way further forward.

Final Transition

The final transition came with abruptness, for being two years in development. In the Wilderness, both sides dug in, but their works were of the piled logs and dirt type-- effective, but not very elaborate. There was a tendency for troops to start digging in almost immediately, but the lines were usually occupied for less than 24 hours.

A week later, at Spotsylvania in the middle of May, a quantum improvement in breastworks occurred. Now, with a little more time in one place, trenches with log retaining walls sprang up strengthened by headlogs and other over head cover. The first phase had begun somewhere between May 7th and 12th. It would end with the complae trench systems of Petersburg, ushering in a new phase of war. Not until the final hours of the Appomattox retreat would the Army of Northern Virginia again be driven to open field campaigning.

West

In the west developments mirrored those in the east. At Stone's River (Dec. 31 '62 to Jan. 2 '63) little mention is made of breastworks, but by Chickamauga (September '63) both sides were routinely using intermediate-style works. One of the best descriptions of later defensive works is provided by Jacob Cox, a Union General in the Atlanta campaign. Cox even pinpoints the transition to universal adoption of digging in -- occurring in June '64 in front of Dallas and New Hope Church, Georgia. From that point forward, he claimed, the Federals developed the habit of erecting works at every significant stop, and of converting them into full trenches if in position more than a day.

Cox's description of worics routinely constructed by both armies bears mention, as it leaves little doubt that both officers and men were now convinced of the need for cover. The officers laid out the prospective line and -- while a skirmish line afforded protection -- the men set to work. A thick log revetment was erected, which in turn supported a thick wall 10 to 13 feet thick at the base. headlogs were emplaced to afford maximum cover and trees felled to the front to form an oostacle line.

Most significantly, the needed tools were now carried with the ammunition trains or with the troops themselves, and they were in relative abundance.

Unquestionably, these trenches were virtually impregnable when opposed by the offensive tactics of the day. Cold Harbor illustrated the futility of the offensive the best, places like Kennesaw Mountain and Franklin also readily show the disparity in loss between a dug in defender and his attacker.

Rules

The question is: How do you capture this evolving tactical concept in the relativdy static setting of a game? Such a rule needs to be easy to use but realistic enough to have meaning.

When we wrote the CWB series rules, we were unable to devise a satisfactory rule that was neither overly complex or too counter (read: cost) intensive. Not every battle could simply have the trench lines printed on the map as permanent features which is the reason for the trench defensive benefits on the various game charts. It was the middle period--winter '63 to summer '64--that raised the complexity issue.

What follows is a compromise. We don't intend to start adding countersheets to our games just to include the necessary 60-70 breastwork markers required of a mandatory rule. That solution would raise the game's final cost by some $6-10 for what amounts to a small gain in realism.

[Ed Note: Thc amount quoted in cost is actually quite accurate. Gamers typically underestimate the effect of small changes in manufacturing because they do notfully realize the impact of wholesale discounts and the like.]

Hence, this optional set of breastwork rules is offered with the caveat that gamers will need to crease their own markers or borrow them from other games. The counters will need to be mared on one side with an "under construction" symbol, and the completed works on the other. A completed breastworks should afford three contiguous protected hexsides which correspond to the frontal hexsides of an infantry unit in line. For want of a more complex "learning process" rule, the following should not be used in games that are occurring before January 1, 1863.

1. Who Can Build Breastworks

Only infantry units in line formation who are at least four hexes away from any enemy unit may build breastworks. Artillery and cavalry may occupy a finished breastwork hex, but may not build them alone. *Cavalry lacked both the tools and inclination to do such work, whlle artillery had the tools but not the manpower to do so.*

2. Construction of Breastworks

On any turn, at the start of the Movement and Close Combat Phase, the player places any "under construction" markers he desires, and flips over any previously placed markers (from earlier) to their breastwork side as long as the infantry unit remains qualified as described above in 1. Under construction markers on units which are *not* at least four hexes from the enemy may not be flipped over, but may remain in place

indefinitely until the proper conditions are fulfilled. Any unit masked with an under consttuction marker may move, but if this leaves the hex without a qualified unit (as per 1, above) the under construction marker is removed.

3. Facing and Removal of Completed Breastworks

At the time the marker is flipped to its completed side, it may be faced as desired.

Once this is done the marker may never change its facing. Only one breastwork marker is allowed per hex -- you may not create miniature forts using multiple markers. At the end of any Movement and Close Combat Phase in which a breastwork marker is alone in a hex, it is removed. If one side captures any breastwork hex via close combat, the marker is removed. A defender who successfully repulses an attacker keeps the marker, but if both sides vacate the hex, the marker is removed.

4. Effects of Breastworks

A unit fired upon via breastwork protective hexsides alone (determined by the orientation of the marker) receives two benefits: a -1 to the die (not a column shift) on the Fire Table, and a + 1 shift on the Morale Table. Furthermore, it is not required to retreat given a morale result marked with a single asterisk (*).

5. Leaders and Breastworks

Considering that these rules are optional, consider the following very optional!

In any game prior to 1 January 1864, a leader must successfully obtain initiative before any unit in his command may construct breastworks. Contrary to the Second Edition rules -- for this purpose only -- more than one leader may roll for a given formation, i.e. if a corps commander fails, his division commanders may check also. Independent units always have permission to build and do not need initiative.

Conversion of Breastworks to Trenches

Units may only convert breastworks to trenches in a game occurring after 1 May 1864.

1. The Process of Conversion

Breastworks may be converted into trenches by regularly qualified units which remain qualified for 12 hours of game time. While converting, these units may not move. If an enemy unit approaches within 4 hexes, the conversion is interrupted (see 2, below). Obviously some sort of wrinen record will need to be kept of units

attempting to convert and the elapsed time spent on conversion.

2. Interruption of Conversion

A unit thtt is interrupted does not lose accumulated time (unless, of course, said unit was forced from the hex in which case the breastworks themselves are forfeit) but instead may wait and resume accumulating time when it again fulfills the requirements.

3. Completion and Effects of Trenches

At the end of 12 hours -- specifically at the end of the friendly Movement and Close Combat Phase replace the breastworks marker with a trench marker. I suggest using markers similar to the breastwork ones with double lines or a different color. Trenches provide protection only from fires through the same set of hexsides the breastwork marker did. The benefits are those given in the series rules and on the standard charts and tables.

Once completed, trenches are never removed from play (unless new trenches are built in the hex with a different facing, etc.) and either side may use them (given the facing of the trench marker.)

[Ed Note: Save this article for use when Bloody Roads South comes out next April.]

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Technique of the
Tank Platoon
as the Point
in an Exploitation

WWII

Author Unknown
Reprinted from Armor in Battle, US Armor School March 1986

The writer was a tank platoon leader in an Armored Division and, as such, was often called on to be the point commander in exploitation missions.

The division used a "married" formation throughout. Consequently, when a tank platoon was assigned to the point, the armored Infantry counterpart also became part of that point.

Riding in the leading vehicle in an armored exploitation can, and often has proved to be, rather deleterious to one's health. At the very best, it is something of a strain on the nervous system. Of course, there is no way to make his task just wholesome, clean fun such as would appeal to any redblooded American boy. However, certain techniques learned over a long period of time, by trial and error, and from watching and noting the trials and erors of others, (coupled with an abundance of the "luck of the Irish") have worked well for the writer.

Ordinarily it was left to the tank Platoon leader to command this group and to decide on the formation to be used. Many, many variations were tried out by platoon officers. Severai factors had to be considered.

Flexibility was an important item. Terrain, weather, expected enemy resistance, and speed of the advance all entered into the picture.

One very troublesome factor was the lack of communication between the half-tracks of the Infantry platoon. If a fight developed and these half-tracks were scattered, the problem of control was acute, (particularly after replacements had been made).

As has been previously stated, several variations became somewhat standard. One of these was tank and half-track alternately. This formation has several disadvantages. For example, it spreads the tank fire power out too far and makes the platoon leader's

control problems more difficult. Then, too, the Infantry control problem is extremely arduous. An outstanding tank platoon leader used this formation, however, and it worked pretty well while he lasted. His chief argument forit was the fact the each infantry squad could protect the tank ahead of it from close-in antitank measures.

However, the writer believes the disadvantages outweigh the advantages in this case.

Formation

Another formation used by many platoon leaders, was three tanks, the Infantry platoon leader's half-track, the other two tanks, then the four other half-tracks of the Infanty platoon. This system enabled the Infantry platoon leader to be far enough forward to see and size up the situation or confer with the tank platoon leader when necessary. In addition, his platoon was all together and far enough back so that it wasn't necessarily under fire and could form and attack as unit.

This formation worked out quite successfulily but it less a thin-skinned vehicle rather far forward and the Infantry platoon leader was still too far from his platoon. Then, too, the half-track hampered, to a degree, the firing of the two tanks behind it. The writer used this formation for several months but finally lined up with the tanks in front and the Infantry behind in column and all together.

This formation put all the tanks up where they could be fired and maneuvered at will. Each tank supported the one in front, each had its sector to cover and the opposition quickly felt the weight of the combined fire. Several instances occurred when a tank was hit but seldom did the antitank weapons get more than one.

The Infantry riding as a group were in good order and could, and did, dismount and get into action quickly on several occasions. A feat seldom, if ever, achieved by the other formations which have come to the writer's attention.

Riding Infantry

A great deal of eyewash has been written and spoken about the subject of riding infantry on the tanks. This was the rule in cenain outfits. It was not uncommon to see a half dozen thoroughly uncomfortable doughboys, often wet, often cold, and always unhappy, clinging precariously to the deck and sponsors of the leading tanks.

They were there as close-in anti-tank protection. Peculiarly, many died when the bazooka hit. Others were killed by antitank gunfire, machine gun fire, et cetera. If they *hadn't* been there the tanks by using wing man tactics and reconnaissance by fire had little or nothing to fear from bazooka men. If you were bazookaed in an exploitation, you were sleeping!

Of course, in a night movement, two or three doughboys on every tank is a good idea

and will offer some protection to the tank when it is standing still. Even then they should be relieved often so that they will be alert and energetic in playing this role.

In this advance party, where should the platoon leader ride? In our division and others, he mde the lead tank. As the late General Patton said, "You can't push a piece of spaghetti, you've got to pull it." Actually, of course, there were several advantages, chiefly the ones of officer prestige and platoon morale. However, it was not good for the morale of the platoon leader's crew necessarily, although the writer detected a bit of quiet swagger slipping out in his own.

Also, a trained officer should have been able to follow a prescribed route more easily. Unfonunately, this wasn't always the case. In fact, it is the writer's firm conviction that had the Gemmans torn down the sign posts, half the American armor would have been lost, or at least, noticeably slowed down.

The "Book" says the point should be a tank section, then the platoon leader, then the other tank section. This is a good idea. It is sound and workable. Too often when the platoon officer was in the leading vehicle, he became embroiled in a fire fight and was too busy properly to employ his platoon. Too busy, in fact, to report the situation to his company commander. This was confusing, ineffectual, and time wasting all around.

If the platoon leader was riding third he might have thatmoment ortwo in which to makehis dispositions and to report before becoming locked in the old 'do or die' business.

Another advantage is one of rotating the point job among all the tanks, keeping a fresh, alert man in front. Then there is the obvious saving in platoon officers, to train whom the government spends certain sizable sums.

Movement

Once the formation or order of march is decided upon the question arises: How should this advance party move? In the exploitation phase speed is of paramount importance. Speed makes for surprise and saves lives and cannot be underestimated. The fact that a swift, aggressive advance actually saves lives in the long run is indisputable. Nevertheless, there are certain methods of movement the advance party can use which will offer a better chance for survival, while accomplishing the mission, than others.

In short, there are certain small techniques which, if employed meticulously, contribute to a fast, uninterrupted advance and minimum losses. The most commonly overlooked of these techniques, apparent in many of our Armored Divisions, was caused by self styled 'aggressive' commanders, who in a mistaken lust for speed 'threw the book away'. This error, which has caused needless confusion and actual

loss of time, was the one of allowing no distance between elements of the advance guard.

What occurred was this. When the leading element ran into fairly stiff resistance it was committed piecemeal, chopped up, and a delay was occasioned by the resultant confusion. It there had been an interval, that is to say, a distance between the point, the advance party and the rest of the advance guard, the situation would have developed more slowly and clearly, and the commander of each element would have had time and space to exercise his command function and use his troops in a deliberate, sound, and tactical manner. Thus he could have brought to bear the force quickly to overcome the resistance.

Of course, the distance between elements should not be great, as one of the precepts of exploitation is to hit 'em hard and quick. However, a blind hammering, taking unnecessary losses, is not a part of the art of war, dependent, as it is, on tank production capacity of the home front.

How should the point platoon move? Should it move in column down the road at a uniform pace? This wu the usual manner in most divisions in exploitation phases. However, it is not the most intelligent and it is not the fastest. Furthermore, it is not the steadiest.

Best Method

The best method in every sense is a movement by bounds; that is, within the advance party. The wayithas worked superbly is this: the Advance Guard commander (leading tank company commander) rides behind the point platoon at some distance. This distance, of course, varies with the terrain, but usually should be sight or not more than five hundred yards. This Advance Guard commander rides at an even pace (often set by the combat commander). He is accompanied by an artillery forward observer, and possibly, by a forward air commander.

In front of him the point platoon works. The leading three tanks moving rapidly from cover to cover under protection of the second section. Great speed can be obtained by making these bounds in an alternate manner. When resistance is met, the Advance Guard commander stops, sizes up the situation and takes action immediately. There is a distance between him and the point and he is free to employ his support intelligently or to by-pass obstacles or strong points without the necessity of back-breaking and reversing the column.

This system was employed by the writer in the latter stages of the war during the advance to the Elbe River. It was discovered that by moving this way the Advance Guard actually had to be requested to slow down by an exceptionally fast moving Combat Commander.

Lead Platoon Advance

While on the point of movement, let us consider the method of advance employed by this lead platoon. As has been stated, the lead three tanks move quickly from cover to cover underthe support of the othersection. By quickly is meant top *speed.* In addition, these moving tanks should take what might be called evasive action (only, of course, if contact is believed imminent). If possible, terrain and weather permitting, these tanks should move abreast or in a modified wedge formation. Usually one on either side of the road and one continually criss-crossing the road.

The writer has said they move from cover to cover. Naturally the distance from one covered position to another may be great, in which case the length of the bound is limited to good fire support from the stationary section. Better not make it more than six hundred yards. These tanks now halt sudddy and the other section moves up fast.

The fastest method is for the platoon leader to pull out in front of this second section and lead it in a fast alternate bound. The safest way is to displace forward successively because the forward section, while halted, has had a chance to size up the route ahead, pick the next stopping place and perhaps reconnoiter by fire. This seems a good place to take the small matter of the use of binoculars.

Binoculars

The writer feels he can state without fear of contradiction that binoculars intelligently, quickly, and ceaselessly used by tank commanders saved many a tank. As is readily apparent to anyone who has tried they cannot be employed in a moving tank, even on the smoothest of roads. All of which is one of the greatest arguments for movement by bounds. A hasty reconnaissance through the glasses saves many a round of ammunition as the alternative is reconnaissanoe by fire. Too, it is the reason the writer stresses the fast move and sudden stop.

Early in the writer's experience, in fact, during his first hour or two of combat, he made the discovery that his driver was too well trained in the smooth stop. When ordered to halt, he coasted to a nice, easy stop. The writer put his binoculars to his eyes as the tank slowed and tried to observe ahead. The vibration made this absolutely impossible until the vehicle actually came to rest. During this fifteen or twenty yards of coasting, the writer was virtually blind and the tank was an easy target, not having even the small advantage of relative speed. Needless to say, it became a part of the driver's technique to halt as abruptly as possible when commanded.

Reconnaisance

This mention of binoculars leads naturally to a discussion of reconnaissance in general. In the exploitation phase of an armored advance, speed and surprise are

essential ingredients. There will be no covering force, no reconnaissance ahead of this leading tank platoon. However, if this plaloon leader wants to give himself a chance for survival, he resorts to three types of reconnaissance (always remembering, though, that speed and surprise are potent advantages forhim and must not be marred by wishy-washy, over cautious progress).

These forms of reconnaissance are: use of binoculars, roconnaissance by fire, and personal dismounted reconnaissance. Added to these might be a fourth. This fourth is beyond words to describe. It is incredible to many people. This is the much sneered at "Nose for Krauts", which many of who believed, and still believe, we had.

Be that as it may, we can discuss the more orthodox methods. The use of binoculars has already been discussed to some extent. It is nearly superfluous to say that scupulous care must be taken care of them. Cleaning material must be handy to wipe away dust and rain. There is a nice, very precise length of the neckstrap. Naturally the focus settings must be known, in fact they must be instinctive. It might be mentioned here that, as he moves, the tank commander picks his danger spots and as soon as he stops, quickly scans each one, then goes back over them again more slowly.

We come to that highly controversial subject: reconnaissance by fire. On this subject the writer had two complete changes of opinion. During his first days in combat, he employed it extensively. Later it seemed distracting, to destroy the element of surprise. Then he gaily rode into a neat ambush just across the Rhine. From then on he fired on everything remotely suspicious on the ground that it was German in any case. Of course, the life span of tractors and other farm vehicles of suspicious sillouette was short indeed.

More seriously it should be said that reconnaissance by fire is almost a necessity of moving steadily. It is sometimes a waste of ammunition, but it has a decided morale factor. It is good for your morale and decidedly disturbing to the other fellows. However, it should be carefully controlled and done intelligently. A movement by bounds, permitting a good look through the glasses eliminates much firing. It is good also to have some sort of signal to notify those behind you that you are merely reconnoitering by fire. Say two short bursts from the co-ax. If this isn't done some of the Infantry behind in the half-tracks will start shooting thirties, fifties, and rifles at everything in sight, thereby thoroughly confusing the issue (which last phrase is every polite way of saying FUBAR).

Certain conditions call for fire reconnaissance such as heavy woods, hedge lined roads, isolated buildings on the flanks and others. The ammunition supply, particularly that readily available in the turret must not be depleted and in some cases may be an important factor restricting this probing fire.

The third type of reconnaissance is the one most often overlookod by tank officers. That is the dismounted personal reconnaissance. Often there wasn't time. More often

the writer is inclined to believe it was merely an unwillingness to leave that steel shell and expose one's person in that lonely, lonely and so very quiet no-man's land.

Drawing again from his own experience, the writer became a believer on the third of August, 1944 when in Yvre, France, he turned a right angle corner in a narrow street and came face to face with a MK IV tank at the ridiculous range of thirty yards. The tank was manned and obviously waiting. Thanks to a gunner who needed no urging or even a command, the writer is presently able to pen this paper.

Thereafter, the writer dismounted and took a peek whenever it seemed indicated. It is better to sneak a peek over the crest of a hill and around the corner than to barge over or around with a tank. You can stretch your luck just so far!

Control

Much has been said about control. Control of the individual tank, the platoon and the oompany. First things must come first. Until one is able to control a tank almost as readily as a good rider controls a horse, he is not ready for designation, Tanker. This control is by interphone but that doesn't tell the whole story.

First there must be a system, a code, a standard procedure. Incidentally this should be standard in the platoon and the company at least. Actually it should be standard throughout the Ammored Foroes. Coupled with this procedure are certain other factors less tangible but mainly based on a close observation of each other by the commander and driver. This obviously can only be achieved through long practice and, while highly desirable, is not necessary as long as there is a standard procedure. That this procedure pays off was evidenced to the writer during the recent misunderstanding in Europe when, because of breakdowns and losses, it was necessary for to fight with seven entirely different crews for varying short periods.

Once this control of the individual tank is achieved (incidentally it involves set procedures between the turret crew members as well a gesture or a poke or a slap is quicker than the interphone) we move into control of the section and platoon. For speed and ease, hand and arm signals are a must and are only limited by the intelligence, state of training and ingenuity of the people involved. Another factor which makes these signals a necessity is the constant radio failure. This ever present failure was due not to design but to the tremendous abuse it was necessary to give the tank radios in pursuit of operations. They were turned on constantly and no time was available for maintenance.

Closely coupled with hand and arm signals was the setting up of simple but rigid standard operating procedures. Some of these were simple plays something like the plays used in football. Others were the sectors of responsibility. Each tank commander had his own and stuck to it. A system the writer employed involved his tank and the first section. When he halted or signalled a halt, the #2 tank habitually

pulled up abreast, if possible, and on the right and immediatly scanned in that direction. The #3 tank performed in like fashion on the left. The following section took the responsibility for the extreme right and left flanks and prepared to move in either direction upon receiving a signal.

Connected with this is a lesson we learned through bitter experience. The German anti-tank guns, whenever possible, were sited to be mutually supporting and designed to suck one in, that is to say, to mousetrap the unwary. At first while using the system outlined above the #2 and #3 tanks would pull into their positions in good style. However, if the platoon leader was firing to his front their attention naturally was attracted and without order they began to fire at targets to the front.

Some of our people then got knocked out by fire from the flanks the worst part of which was the fact that no one saw where the shot came from. The experience made it necessary for the #2 and #3 tank commanders to ignore the front and to cover their own areas. Naturally they glanced quickly every moment or two towards the platoon leader for orders but rigidly covered the sector for which they were responsible.

It can be said that control within the platoon depends on many things. Experience and practice of course are the best ways of developing this control. Then there is the method of control often listed as the final resort in the texts. This is usually referred to as 'example of the Commander'. Nothing can take the place of this method. However, it will have no effect unless the Commander has achieved a reputation for intelligence, for skill and has been able to inculate in his people an unswerving all for one, one for all spirit.

While the writer does not necessarily advocate this policy for units larger than a platoon, he is convinced that nothing short of unqualified respect will do. If coupled with this respect, he can generate a spirit of absolute, utter comradeship his path will be easier, his chance for success then will be most likely.

The tank plaloon leader is faced with a situation unique among officers. Each crew has five men. He is part of the crew of his tank. Obviously as a tank commander, he has many menial, purely physical duties to perform. He must help with the refueling. He must clean guns. He must help change tracks. He stands guard duty in combat. It is necessary for him not only to perform these duties but he must do them expertly. He cannot ever exhibit fear for he must zealously guard the morale of his men.

During an exploitation when men and machines are pushed to the limit, his job is multiplied many times. These are the times when his good nature cannot, ever momentarily, fail. All this can be accomplished easily if the leader has a genuine affection for his men and thoroughly understands their weakness and their strength and respects their inherent nobility.

This paper has no footnotes, no references but is the result of one man's research, his

trials and errors and the trials and errors of many others who are now represented by a white cross somewhere in Europe.

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Origins 91 Report

Convention

by Dean N. Essig

Origins this year was the best show of the last four years or so. From a sales standpoint (using our booth as a measure -- the only figures I deem truly reliable), this year's show was almost as good as the last three *combined!* It was at least three times greater than last year's abysmal showing at Atlanta. From my discussions with other manufacturers, our success was matched by their making the whole show measure in relation to the sales we could both see and count. It was a good one.

New products unveiled in Baltimore were:

> Avalon Hill -- Battle of the Bulge, nth edition.
> Robin Hood (a movie tie-in).
>
> GDW -- Stand and Die.
>
> TSR -- Pacific Theater of Operations
>
> GMT -- Alexander
>
> 3W -- Roark's Drift
>
> Pacific Rim -- Counterattack #3 (Believe it or Not)
>
> Victory -- The Peloponnesian War
>
> and, of course, Barren Victory.

Much to our disappointment, Clash of Arms did not have Ligny or Quatra Bras available and Fresno had no finished games at all.

We had interesting discussions with several very kind industry types, among those to add to your "good guys" list are: Marc Miller of GDW, Gene Billingsley of GMT, and Ed Wimble & Steve Rawlings of Clash of Arms. Gene, much to our approval, managed the difficult task of bringing GMT through its troubles last year (explosive

partnerships are not a pretty sight) and seems to have stabilized operations. Our hats are off to him.

Richard Berg had a booth from which to squeeze some more sales out of SDI's ship wrecked hull. From our vantage, however, he seemed to spend most of his time discussing mail fraud laws with unhappy purchasers of Blood and Sand. Much of the time the booth was left in the hands of his son -- until Sunday, when Richard departed early in the day -- without much fanfare.

Our usual lecture circuit was followed by a small but very astute and interesting audience. Thanks to all who anended and especially those who stayed after to chat or went to the 8:00pm talks. The questions showed that the listeners had a good knowledge of the rules and systems in our games and numerous good discussions were had. Thanks.

Next year, we will be sharing an island booth with Clash of Arms and GMT -- a sort of wargaming redoubt in the mass of D&D types who will be at Origins/GenCon in Milwaukee. Be sure to make plans to be there. It should be even better!

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Enough Room for All

New Companies

by Dean N. Essig

This is a time to be inspired by our hobby. A number of small firms have broken forth to help diversify the quality and topic of the games being produced. This is the good and productive edge of the desktop publishing revolution with the proper equipment, anyone with a reasonable amount of skill can produce top-of-the-line wargame graphics. We, as well as others, are just now beginning to unleash the full potential of the systems currently available -- systems which give us a control and freedom of action companies of the past could only dream about.

My hat is off to those who have taken advantage of the new methods of production to bring us more and beuer games -- XTR (Command Magazinc), GMT, and Rhino come to mind as the forerunners of the new wave. You can take advantage of this too -- both as consumer and potential manufacturer. As a consumer, the new wave gives you more, better looking games and games of a range of topics not possible before.

Why? Because you (as the potential manufacturer) can for the first time produce a one-time release on your favorite topic and make it as good as "the big boys." I encourage you to do this -- and I'm willing to give you whatever advice I can if you give me a ring.

To produce high quality graphics, all a new company needs is a decent Macintosh computer with color capabilities, a good service bureau who can handle films, and a printer willing to be patient. Start small and grow into what you want to become -- don't jump in with both feet loudly proclaiming your first "monster" release! When you have your "2nd Punic War" ready for distribution, give me a call or talk to the distributors listed in this issue. And, good luck -- you're on your way!

Where does this new wave of sprout companies leave The Gamers in the scheme of things? Basically, right where we were -- very comfortable. Do we feel threatened, etc.? Of course not, the game industry is very small, but there is plenty of room for new blood and ideas. Cut-throat competition and market share womes not only do not matter, but are also harmful in thc longrun. Gaming is plenty large to hold a number of small firms who complement each other in topic, style and quality. Gaming is not large enough to sustain budding egomaniacs with dreams of hobby domination and such rubbish.

Numerous small companies can give gamers alternatives when one or another fails to meet expectations in quality, timeliness, topic, or price. You'll never have to support a company with crummy products because "the hobby will die" if you don't. There will always be someone waiting in the wings who is willing to give his game a try. And, that is the way I'd like it to be.

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In Brief

Editorial

by Dean N. Essig

A common refrain in game reviews these days seems to be "games can't simulate reality, so why waste time trying?" This pontification being used as filler when the reviewer doesn't want to waste time studying the game and its play -- but that's another issue. Is this point valid? My views on the issue are below.

Games can never place the player in the shoes of the commanders who were there -- that is simply true and should be obvious to anyone with a passing knowledge of both games and military reality. If you want to experience what "it" is like, I can suggest a better way than Bill Mauldin's in his book *Up Front...*

"Dig a hole in your backyard while it is raining. Sit in the hole until the water climbs around your ankles. Pour cold mud down your shirt collar. Sit there for forty-eight hours, and...imagine that a guy is sneaking around waiting for a chance to club you on the head or set your house on fire.

Get out of the hole, fill a suitcase full of rocks, pick it up, put a shot gun in your other hand, and walk on the muddiest road you can find. Fall flat on your face every few minutes as you imagine big meteors streaking down to sock you.

After ten or twelve miles...start sneaking through the wet brush...Give some friend a rifle and have him blast in your direction once in a while.

If you repeat this performance every three days for several months you may begin to understand why an infantryman sometimes gets out of breath. *But you still won't understand how he feels when things get tough."* [emphasis added]

The point is that a game can't let you in on what its really like -- and its a good thing too, because "realistic games wouldn't be too much fun. The problem I have with the reviewer's statement is that it is not attacking games on the grounds of "making it like the real thing" but that games not only don't, but can't, give reasonably accurate results. And, that's not right!

Games give a good approximation of real results -- given decent parameters and a good model (the game.) Much like the calculus which tries to simulate curves with an

infinite series of straight lines, wargames attempt to fit a square peg in a round hole by varying the number of sides. A very simple, abstract game might make a fairly good fit while a excessivdy detailed "simulation" misses entirely.

Why? Besause the number of sides on our wargame peg is not as clearly related to increases in detail as a simple analogy to calculus methods might suppose. Take tank kills. For a given weapon at a given range to kill a given target tank might be a 60% chance in real life. The ultra-detailed armor simulation, in an attempt to be very ascurate, breaks down the shot into as many as a dozen different parameters each of whish the designer must guesstimate the amount and significance of effects (there is no good hard data on many things gamers take as gospel.)

When he's done, the complicated game might end up with a grossly inaccurate final probability because the sum of the independently rated parameters is only an accumulation of their errors. Meanwhile, game designer B takes a wholly different approach. He simplifies the tank fire to a couple of easily identifiable values which very quickly generate something close to the 60 percent required. Game players will invariably think designer A's game is more accurate because of his dozens of carefully calculated (it seems) variables, while they will decry designer B's game as too simple to give good results. In actuality, the reverse is true -- but game players have accepted as fact that more detail means more accuracy.

Breaking things down into their relevant points is a product of modern education. Often a list of "important factors" is memorized and that list then passes for understanding. While the list may very well be true, it gives little clue as to the relative importance of the given factors or how the affect/relate to each other.

Can wargames simulate reality well enough to generate decent results? Yes, but only if the man behind the design is well aware of the interrelationship and relative importance of the differing effects he must give values for. There is no magical reference work to consult, it is all based on intuitive feel. Game players should not be buffaloed into thinking otherwise by a smokescree of numbers and separated values.

Many thanks to those who wrote letters and sent in game ratings. You'll see a few small changes to the chart as games "jockey" for position. The big change was in the number of "not enough votes" games. There are now a lot of one vote wonders in that list which will need a bunch of votes in order to make the chart's minimum of 25 percent. As always, we need more ratings for next time, more letters to publish, more Q&A questions, and articles...I have but two outside articles for this mag so far -- and that's not enough. Please write up your thoughts or, at least, send your ideas of things you want us to write about.

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Out Brief

A Company Philosophy

by Dean Essig

While most game companies seem to have no philosophy of action at all, we like to think we have a company philosophy and that it is a good one. Con tained here is an overview of that philosophy, which (while not exhaustive) should be a good guide to our operations. This listing is not in any particular order, except that customer service ranks first by far.

1. Customer Service

Wargamers have traditionally been treated like dirt. This practice is not only wrong and destructive, it is pathetic. Why gamers have put up with such an abysmal level of customer service, I cannot understand. Of course, many *didn't* and have now left the hobby behind. A dedication to customer service, in our eyes, begins (not ends) with the sale. Firstly, products should be shipped u soon as possible when the order arrives -- not weeks later-- and the order must be filled *correctly*. If a poor quality component slips through, immediate replacement should be expected. Telephone questions should be answered immediately with all respect and courtesy. Mailed rules questions should be answered right away (while they are important) not months later. The customer must be treated as a trusted friend -- not as a state enemy!

2. Product Quality

The games we sell are the very best we can put together with our technical resources and skill. The game's design should highlight what we feel, through diligent study, are the salient features of warfare at a given time period and scale. Physically, the product should be as attractive and functional as we can make it. We make our fair share of errors -- but an effort is placed into action to make a few as humanly possible. And, we continue to learn, too. Look at the original *In Their Quiet Fields* counters if you have them. They look the way they do not because we didn't care, but because that was the limit of my technical knowledge at the time. Compare those to the *Barren Victory* counters and I hope you will be able to tell a matted improvement.

3. On-Time Performance

This point must seem awfully trivial to our competitors, since they ditch it so often.

what's peculiar is I don't understand *why*. Like us, they set their own deadlines. Is it that hard to set a deadline you can hit? On time performanoe is important. It's frustrating to wait months, nay years, for a game to come out -- only to find the end result isn't worth the wait. "But," they say, "we didn't want to *rush* to meet some deadline!" Yeah, right. We set deadlines we can comfortably meet. Like I said, I can't understand it.

4. "Entire Spectrum Product Line

Every time we come out with a different type of game from what we had been doing, I get several letters asking if we had given up on X series games and if all we were going to be putting out were Y series games from now on. Relax. We publish our production schedule out a year in advance, so there shouldn't be any great surprises.

What we are doing is also pretty obvious -- we are slowly covering multiple bases. Eventually, I hope to publish one or more titles per year in each series. This should give something for most everyone. The number of series will slowly increase over the years -- covering more time periods and scales. Dead ends (if any) will be dropped and successful series will continue.

In addition to the above, a range of complexity levds will bo provided for. Actually, this amounts to "normal level" series (TCS, CWB, OCS) which provide a definidve look at a time period and scale, and our "simpler level" series (SCS) which give a lower complexity treatment with a given trade-off in accuracy, detail, and complication.

5. Responsible Attitude

Along with on-time performance, we refuse to follow any "announce every game idea" policy as seen elsewhere. We make promises we can deliver. If we can't deliver, or have a reasonable doubt, we don't promise it. Its just that simple.

6. Professional Behavior

In basic terms this means keeping one's head above the surrounding muck. Avoidance of designer to reviewer shouting matches, etc. That is, even in the case where we are literally baited by the reviewer as in the case of the infamous Bloody 110th "review." In a business sense, this means payment of bills on time, correct charging of orders and records of customer credits and debts. And, all of the topics before and after this one.

7. Sturdiness, Solidity, and Stability

All the above are aimed at this one. Giving you guys something you can count on.

We do what we say we will and say what we are going to do in plain terms. If you send in a pre-pub, you get the game when we said you would. If something isn't right, we'll make it right. Instead of trying to keep up with our latest batch of promises, you can yank out a year old "Up and Coming" column to find out what is coming out when. Also in order to promote stability, our course has been one of slow steady growth. I can happily admit we achieved our original goals quickly and set new, slightly higher, ones. This process of continual adjustment will continue.

That's the way I want to run a business. It's the way The Gamers Inc. has been run since its startup. Sure, we had to learn a lot on the way, and make a fair number of mistakes, but these were our guiding principles from day one. Our education continues...

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Civil War Brigade Series

Q&A

Do orders from army HQ to a corps have to static exactly how divisions Ln the corps are to fight?

No. As long as they remain within command radius, divisions can be used as desired as the corps attempts to fulfill its mission. Such detail may be used if desired, but it is unneeded.

Can HQ's move about as desired or do they need orders?

Except for the army HQ, all HQ's may only move if such movement b required by their orders, or the player is executing an emergency Corps retreat. Otherwise, HQ's are to be considered to be nailed in place by giant stakes driven into the ground. The army HQ, however, is completely free to move about as desired -- it is above such restrictions!

Should orders be executed in the sequence they are received, or what?

Newly accepted orders supercede old orders as they are accepted. The player may write as patt of the new order to finish the operadon in progress before starting on the newer command.

How do division commanders give divisional goals to cavalry brigades?

In the same manner as a corps commander must stack with the brigade in question.

OK, since the division commander must always stack with one of his brigades, does he have to drag a brigade with him when going to pick up another brigade winch is away somewhere with a divisional goal?

Literally speaking, the rules state he would have to drag 1000 men withhim todo such apick up. If payers agree, a more flexible appmach would be to allow the leaderto issue a divisional goal to brigade "A" to stay in place, and then go ga brigade "B." Technically, this is not allowed, but it is a very rare occurrence that is not accounted for in the rules.

To reinforce marches for both sets of 2 MP's, can I go directly to the 1 1/2+

Straggler Table?

No, you must first roll on the Straggler Table for the first set of two MP's and then again on the higher table for the second set.

Are the Straggle Recovery Conditions enforced at the tune the marker is placed, when the die is rolled for recovery, or both?

Straggler recovery conditions must be continuously from the time the marker is placed until the die is rolled. Any break of the conditions in-between causes the marker to be removed.

In a close combat, an "additional morale check" is called for, does this involve thc Close Combat Morale modifiers?

No, it is a normal morale check only.

What happens to morale check results and the morale checks after fire loss in close combat?

These are ignored. Morale checks for a close combat are made as part of the close combat sequence only.

Can I attack with wrecked brigades into a close combat?

Not mendoned in the first edition, this is expressly prohibited in the second edition.

My game does not mention any anti-initiatives, how do I find out what they should be? What are they anyway!

If the game's designer does not include any anti-initiatives or ody mentions them for a few leaders, all unnamed combinations are assumed to have an anti-initiative of zero. The designer will only include these when needed. Anti-initiatives represent the friction between a commander and his superior, which contributes to a lack of desire of the subordinate to stick his neck out. He will do as told, but nothing more.

My unit, sadly, has to retreat in a rout. It is at the head of a column of other troops. If I draw a line from the fire to my unit, a direct rear route will take them right through the column. Do I have to retreat in this way, or can I sidestep one hex and retreat along the column?

Retreating the column. The path of least resistance to the routing troops and whatever little control over them their officers might have will be directed into getting their panic stricken men out of the way of the rest of the division (and avoiding a major

catastrophe!) This can be taken to extreme (with brigades running along in front of a line, parallel to the enemy, which is wrong and must be taken case by case to make sure the 'locally to the rear' rule is enforced.

My retreating unit retreats into a ZOC. That unit, however, has already fired. Does this matter?

No. The unit gets another shot at the unit violating its ZOC.

Civil War Brigade Series

Game Errata

by Dean Essig

1-01 In their Quiet Fields, 2nd Edition

1. M/D/M/2 should be M/DH/2 on the counter.

2. 1/3/2 and 2/3/2 are overstacked in the initial set up. Place 1/3/2 in any adjacent hex.

3. A number of Loss Charts were shipped which were improperly printed. If you do not have both Union and Confederate Charts (printed on one big sheet in the 2nd Ed), let us know and will replace your sheet with a correct one.

1-02 Thunder at the Crossroads

1. There are no Corps-level anti-initiative ratings for either side.

2. There is no Entry Hex 1. In all cases, the Union player gets points for Controlling Entry Hex H, instead.

3. The Confederate player gets 10 VP for Entry Hex E (not F) and 5 VP for Entry Hex F (not G).

4. Each wrecked Union Cavalry Brigade is worth three (3) VP's, not one.

5. Current strength Chart

> S/J/2--strength on 3rd and 4th days is 14, not 10.
> Stwl/J/2--strength on 3rd and 4th days is 10, not 14.
> B/Heth/3 -- strength on 2nd, 3rd, and 4th days is 8, not 9.
> A/Heth/3--strength on 2nd and 3rd days is 9, 4th day is 5.

6. Loss Chart corrections:

Iron Bripde (1/1/1) is missing five strength circles. (Note: this error is on the original,

two color loss charts only. Later loss charts, all in black, have corrected the error.)

2/1/3 should have an original strength of 22, not 12

7. Union Arrival Schedule:

At 12 noon July 2, Gregg and 1/VCav arrive with 1xCb, not 3xCb.

8. Confederate Arrival Schedules:

In order to correct a game imbalance, allow the Rebel army supply train to arrive at 4.00 pm. July 1, with Anderson's Division. This holds for both the Jackson Lives and historical orders of arrival.

9. Jackson Lives Scenario:

Two new divisions are created in this scenario, Ew/2 and LD/2.

Their wrecked levels are as follows:
Ew/2 O/O
LD/2 OOOOO/O

1-03 August Fury

1. If for any reason a newly arriving unit finds its entry area blocked by enemy forces, it may appear, one Turn later, at the closest unblocked map edge hex, in my formation desired.

2. The CsARW Supply arriveses 9:00am., the 29th, at area A.

3. Remove The 3v Supply wagon from both Scenario 2 and 6 set ups. The wagon enters at 5:00a.m. on the 29th with McDowell which is the first turn of both scenarios and does not begin on the map.

1-04 Barren Victory

1. There are two Entry Area F's on the map. The one on the North map edge should be a G. There are supposed to be two Entry Area G's.

2. The Ammo and Casualty tracks for both sides were set up from 1 to 10 instead of 0 to 9. Please use the 10 as the 0.

3. The use of Kershaw and MccLaws is not explained. McLaws is an optional unit for use when the "rest of M/1" variant is used. Kershaw is the normal commander of

M/1. When the regular reinforcements of M/1 come on the map he is their commander. When the option is used, ignore ershaw and bring on McLaws instead.

4. The example of forest in the terrain key was omitted. What the forest symbol looks like should be obvious. The use of the words "forest" and "woods" in the Terrain Notes of the rule book are inexact--read "woods" to mean open.

5. The dice rolls given as examples in the rules for Lee and Johnston to bypass Wing structure are incorrect. Johnston needs 11+, Lee needs 9+. The number listed for Bragg (12) is correct.

6. The two optional Reserve Corps Batteries -- Rb(5), Rb(2) should be omitted when seting up the game. Where the set up calls for "Reserve Corps, all" it is too easy to forget that these two batteries are optional and should not be set up. Be sure to keep them with the optionals.

7. The reference to "5" in 4.2f should be to 4.2e.

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Tactical Combat Series

Q&A

Why can't vehicles and infantry make smoke?

Vehicle based smoke dispensers would be an unnecessary game complication and is already factored into the Point Fire Table. Infantry units have a very limited ability to generate very small amounts of smoke, as with the vehicles, this is already factored into the game's tables. Neither causes enough of a stir to warrant marking the map with smoke.

What's the point of "Persistent Chem" markers in the Modern Expansion?

They attack any unit which enters their hex after they land. Nonpersistent chem only attacks when it lands, persistent does this also, but then hangs around to make life tough for a while.

What's the advantage of being in a Hasty Defense? You don't have dug-in status as Prepared Defenses, so what's the point?

Hasty defenses are quicker to establish than prepared ones and the units won't have to "run away" like they would if they were "without orders."

Since TRPs are chosen before play, must they be observable by friendly units at the beginning?

No. TRP's are free to be established anywhere and do not have to be observed.

What is a "section sized unit?

A section is a two step unit usually marked with a two dot size in its unit symbol. About 12-15 men.

Why does move mode units in a City/Village hex get a +1 terrain modifier on the Area Fire Table? Shouldn't this be a -1?

+1 is correct. Move mode units are assumed to be in the street, moving. They may be taking advantage of the walls, etc., but they still must negotiate corners and cross in front of cross-streets, which are always deadly traps. They are exposed more than the

usual group so they get a +1.

Does Mounted Infantry provide the -2 Die roll modifier against AT Rolls?

In the standard TCS yes, in the Modern Expansion, no when speaking of enclosed MICV's.

Can ICM (no effect on vehicles with defense of 2 or more) still roll on the Artillery/Mortars vs. Point Target Table?

No. Once the bomblets are dispered, there is no large round left that might destroy a vehicle.

Do Pop-ups in Suppressive Fire need an LOS or are they exempt as in overwatchfire?

These pop ups are also freed from regular LOS. An LOS from 100 meters is needed to fire, but none before the pop-up.

How are both type targets engaged by Chem attack?

They are hit as area targets and as point targets.

When using AA fires in the Suppressive Fire Phase, do all get to shoot? Or, do you alternate on a firer by firer basis?

AA fires are like AT Rolls in that a firer can engage any number of targets. The problem is that they are not restricted by range as much and are less controlled because of it. As a literal interpretation, they all fire on each target in succession. The problem is that the original AA rules were written with air sorties in mind, and not on map helicopters. As a house rule, I would suggest adopting the firer by firer alternation when speaking of AA fires, allowing multiple AA attacks on a single target and of allowing the horizon to light up on a single target at a time.

Some AA units require LOS but not visibility. Can these units fire through smoke?

Yes. Smoke in this case is considered a "visibility hinderance" and nothing more. AA units of this type ignore smoke. Also, AA units which do require visibility may fire out of a smoke hex, but not through one.

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Tactical Combat Series

Game Errata

by Dean Essig

2-01 Bloody 110th

1. Add the 38th PzJg Bn (all) to the Historical Order of Arrival to the other units arriving at 0200, 17 Dec 44. The 273 Flak did not enter the map is correct in not being on the Order of Arrival.

2. Only one German Bridge may be built during the game. If a bridge allows the use of Areas 3 and 4, the player need not wait to reduce Hosingen before using Area 3 when the bridge is up. Hosingen only makes units wait which are trying to enter Areas 4 or 5.

3. 2 PG Regimental troops, 2x Gw38(t), enter with 2/2 PG in the Historical Order of Arrival.

4. One 38th Pioneer Platoon was printed without a morale. All has the same morale as the others in its company (5).

2-02 Objective: Schmidt

1. Teaching Scenario #4, Forward Observer, ignore the portion of the U.S. victory condition that calls for occupation of all of Vossenack.

2. Scenario 3: Ignore the German 150mm Artillery ammo supply. It is not needed.

3. Scenario 5: Under German Artillery Batteries Available, 1/843 should instead be the 1/4/89.

4. The German Fus/275th should have more boxes for each company, 1 through 4, instead of just one box for the batallion.

3-01 Force Eagle's War

1. Two of 2/E's ITV's were printed with the same info on the front and back. The

backs of these units should read P B 15, like the others.

Once More Into the Breach

Errata

by Dean Essig

Probably the most frustrating thing I have to deal with is the problem of unintended errors which are generated when I fix something else. The below is an exampk of this phenomena. What appears to be a waste of space reprinting the TCs Addenda from the last time is actually a corrected version of the previous one. What happened? Well, to make a long story short, in fixing the number of die rolls for overwatch, I inadvertently made units nearly invincible at range three or less. The problern was spotted by Rod Miller during his game of Bloody 110th in which the sentence "When automatic permission is granted (range 3 or less), a permission roll of 6 is assumed." This means tht regardless of overwatch marking, someone will always get to shoot when a trigger cccurs at range three or less.

This was not intended. The below solves the problem by allowing the automatic permission (which will allow unmarked units to fire freely) but still requires the 6 roll on one die to get one or more marked units to fire. This brings about a more direct simulation. It would be difficult to close that last 300 yards but not impossible and the saving of units for "later" (by not firing overwatch too soon) should be important.

As it was, when units closed to attack, not only would lead fly thick and fast from unmarked units but every marked mortar battery in 25 hexes would light up the hex also. While I am of late a mortarman, and my thumbs permanently so, this is incorrect and excessive. The below should give a much better simulation. Thanks for bringing this to my attention, Rod.

Errata to the Second Edition TCS Rules

Oops! The Mortar and AT gun symbols are still switched in the Weapon Unit types diagram on the top of page 3. You-know-who forgot to switch them when the 2nd Ed went to press..

89 Overwatch Fires (Simplification addenda, Optional)

To simplify the die roll procedure, add the following to the given rules.

.. A roll for *Permission to Fire* is as follows. On a 5, overwatch fire by units which

are not overwatch marked as desired. On a 6, roll another die. This roll is the number of overwatch marked units that may fire in addition to any non-marked units the player desires to fire. When automatic pennission is granted (range 3 or less) roll of 5 can be assumed, but a die must still be rolled and a 6 hit to fue marked units. All other overwatch rules are in effect. The additional roll per overwatch marked unit is dispensed with. <>**12.5 Mode Change in Movement (Addenda Optional)**

Vehicle and carrier units (only) may change mode buing movement. Such units may change mode at a 1/2 cost of their movement allowance. This mode change may be made at any point in their movement as long as the required movement points are still available. Units that are overwatch marked and switch mode have the marker automatically removed. Mode change during the Mode Determination Phase is unchanged.

Minor Weapons Different (Optional)

This rule gives life to the minor weapons difference between +2 and -2 on the Point Fire Table. It is not needed for play, unless a given player is particularly concerned about such things. This rule has no effect on Point Fire Table columns other than +2 to -2.

Attack - Defense					
Dice Mod	+2	+1	0	-1	-2
-1 on	-	-	1	1-2	1-4
0 on	1-2	1-4	2-5	3-6	5-6
+1 on	3-6	5-6	6	-	-
.... One Die					

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
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