

Operations
The Wargaming Journal

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The Battle of Chickamauga

**Warren
Victory**

September 19th & 20th, 1863
Civil War, Brigade Series #4



Premier Issue

In this Issue:

- Civil War, Brigade Series
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The Gamers

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Forest for the Trees

Analysis of Defensive Benefits of Woods During the American Civil War

by Dave Powell

While the Civil War, Brigade Series has met with overall approval, there are some minor controversies that never seem to go away. One of these is the effect of woods on fire combat, and why units don't receive defensive benefits on the fire CRT when shot at in the trees. After all, the argument ran, other games had such effects. Ergo, the CWB needed them too. So where are they?

Despite a brief effort to explain our logic in the designer's notes of Thunder at the Crossroads, the questions still come in. This time I'll try to explain our rationale more fully, and provide a few historical examples of combat actions to justify our reasoning.

The Gamers' rationale in first designing the CWB was to provide a vehicle for portraying Civil War combat at the brigade level without drowning the system in complicated clutter, while providing sufficient detail to hold one's interest. We wanted a game that was a simulation, but also playable in two to three sittings.

Among the numerous questions that demanded attention in the design were woods effects. While we knew that most other tactical Civil War games had them, we questioned the need for their inclusion. In the final design, tree effects were omitted, since the woods benefit was just not borne out by examining historical losses.

Woods Benefit?

Initially, I personally considered a defensive woods benefit worthwhile, and easily done (a simple die roll modifier or column shift). However, as time went on, I began to closely study combat situations to try and determine what effect woods did have on combat, and formed a new opinion. Study suggested to me that unit losses failed to decline when a unit formed line in the trees.

The reason was that Civil War units maintained their battlelines even inside the tree lines, in order to preserve that most vital of combat functions: command control. (Except when skirmishing.) Additionally, combat occurred at much closer ranges,

where the greatly increased lethality of the weapons offset any protective factor from tree trunks. Combat at 10 to 30 yards was common in the woods, a range which was all but suicidal (and almost unheard of) in the open.

In examining situations, I looked for easily isolated circumstances where combat occurred in both open and wooded terrain. I also tried to find situations where the action was of short duration, 1 to 2 hours (two to four turns), and where most or all of the appreciable loss of the units involved for that battle occurred during the particular event chosen. Ultimately, I chose three actions, Brawner's Farm, McPherson's Woods, and Little Round Top, to substantiate my contention.

Before embarking on an examination of these three actions, I should spend a moment defining terms. Distances of over 200 yards are considered two hex range, of 200 to 50 yards are 1 hex range, and of less than 50 yards to be close combat, or same hex, range; assuming clear terrain. Woods constricted combat dramatically, to less than 50 yards for the most part. Close combat in the woods is defined as combat at about 15 yards.

Brawner's Farm

Brawner's Farm occurred on the evening of August 28th, 1862, a prelude to the battle of Second Bull Run (see August Fury). The Union Iron Brigade -- the 2nd, 6th & 7th Wisconsin, plus the 19th Indiana -- along with the 76th New York and 56th Pennsylvania of Doubleday's brigade, same division, were attacked by five brigades of Jackson's Left Wing.

The whole battle lasted about three hours and was divided into three phases: from 6:00 until 6:40, (1 turn) the Federals deployed with minor losses. The Rebels brought up their own infantry and for the next 90 minutes (3 turns) a firefight raged, with the lines between 70 and 100 yards apart. Finally, darkness brought the action to an end, though random firing continued until 9 p.m. (2 more turns). The serious fighting and major losses resulted from the three turn firefight between the infantry, conducted at 1 hex range. The closest distance reported by any of the participants was 70 yards.

The Federals had approximately 2487 men engaged in the firefight, 1937 from the Iron Brigade and 550 from Doubleday's two regiments. The Federal line was about 1000 yards long (5 hexes), though not solid, for a gap of at least 200 yards was left in the center to meet the Rebel line, which initially overlapped both Union flanks. The Confederates made no real effort to exploit this gap or take the Union troops in flank, but contented themselves with linear exchanges of volleys. The Union lost 961 of the 2500 engaged. Of this figure, only a very few were lost in the first and last portions of the fight. For example, the 95th New York, which received only artillery fire and was not involved in the firefight, reported a loss of 16 men.

Final results: 25 strength points, occupying four hexes, lost 9 strength points

(rounding down to account for the above mentioned artillery inflicted losses and other casualties not specifically incurred during the firefight) in three turns. All units involved were exposed in open fields.

Confederate losses are not so easily determined. The Rebels ultimately commined portions of six separate brigades (6400 men) to this action, and certainly suffered losses in equal proportion to the Federals. Regiments of the Stonewall Brigade, for instance, reported losses of up to 40% in their small units.

However, most of these troops also bore the brunt of heavy fighting for the next two days, in the 2nd Banle of Bull Run. Separating losses for individual firefights embraced within the larger action of the three day battle (counting Brawner Farm as the starting point) would be nothing more than guesswork.

McPherson's Woods

The second action occurred on July 1st, 1863, at Gettysburg. Again the Union Iron Brigade was involved, this time against Archer's Brigade of Heth's Division. It was a meeting engagement, with the Federals arriving to replace Union dismounted cavalry in opposing the advancing Rebels.

The Union regiments deployed into line and advanced up the east side of McPherson's Ridge, which was partially covered by an irregularly shaped grove of trees and orchard. The Union troops met the Rebels at the crest of the ridge, two units inside the trees and the other two regiments in the open fields around it. Archer's troops were surprised and fell back in disorder. The Yankees pursued, advancing several hundred yards, across the small valley containing Willoughby's Run and halfway up another ridge.

As with the Rebel losses at Brawner Farm, both forces here were involved in heavy fighting later in the battle. Fortunately, however, these actions are more readily broken down into discreet incidents which can be used to infer losses.

The Federals numbered 1470, and lost at least 450. Of these, losses in the woods amounted to 205 of 666 men or 30.8%. In the open, 804 men lost 245 or 30.5%. The Southerners took 1197 men into the fight. Due to incomplete reports, it is unclear which units fought in the woods and which were in the clear, but at least half of the brigade was in the trees.

The brigade losses for the action number at least 342, 28.5% (and were probably much higher, closer to two thirds of the three-day total, 456 or 38%. I have chosen the smaller figure as a minimum.) The entire action lasted less than one turn, and each line occupied between 300 and 400 yards of front, two hexes. In game terms, the Federals clearly launched a close combat. As can be seen, the numbers here indicate no lower losses for those men fighting in the trees.

Little Round Top

Little Round Top, July 2nd 1863, was also a brigade sized affair, with half the force in and half out of the woods. This was a bloody action, involving both one hex combat and close combat as well. Also, this fight was the only real fighting done by any of the involved regiments, I Northern or Southern, at Gettysburg, and so the losses suffered here by each side can be determined with greater precision.

Little Round Top is one of the most famous actions of the war, pitting Vincent's Union brigade (reinforced by the 140th New York of Weed's Brigade) against elements of Law's and Robertson's Brigades. The Union forces were deployed in line along the southwest face of Little Round Top, posted to meet the rapidly approaching Rebels. Vincent's men, 1300 strong, held a 400 yard line. The regiments were posted in the order described above, running from left to right. All of the 20th ME and half of the 83rd PA were in the woods, the rest of the troops were in the open, on the rock-strewn but exposed face of the hill. There was no time for Union troops to significantly improve their position with breastworks.

The time question is more difficult to determine, especially since so many conflicting descriptions of the action exist. The fighting probably lasted about 90 minutes, three turns of game time, but there may have been some significant pause between specific Rebel attacks as those forces regrouped. The Rebels advanced to their first attack, the 4th ALA, 4th and 5th Texas striking first at the center of the Union line, near the juncture of the 83rd PA and the 44th NY, and then spreading northwards.

The first Rebel attack did not seem to come closer than 50 yards, ending in a repulse. Then the three CSA Regiments fell back to about 500 yards distance to reform. The second attack swept forward, this time including the 15th and 47th AL, who maneuvered to flank the 20th Maine's Line. This time the lines closed further. In the open end of the line, reports indicated that the men closed to within 30 yards; over in the woods the distance closed to 10 yards, with perhaps some hand to hand fighting.

At the peak of this second attack, the 140th NY arrived to reinforce Vincent's right flank. On the left, the 20th ME refused its flank and repulsed the Alabama troops. The Rebels fell back a second time, the Texans to about 300 yards distance and the Alabamans, in the woods maintained tenuous contact with the Yankees at about 50 yards. Finally the Rebels prepared to withdraw, having concluded that they could not take the Union position. At this moment, the 20th ME attacked and forced the 15th and 47th AL to retreat precipitously. This counterattack brought the action to a close.

As previously stated, none of the engaged troops fought any other significant action at Gettysburg. The Federals numbered 1336 in Vincent's Brigade, with the 140th NY adding 447 more men, for a total of 1783. They occupied an initial position 400 yards in length (two hexes). This line contracted due to losses but was also extended by the arrival of the 140th, probably not exceeding 450 yards overall.

For at least 150 yards, all of the 20th ME and half the 83rd PA were in the woods. The Union line breaks down as follows: open, 1247 men over 250 yards; woods, 536 men over 150 yards. Losses: total, 485 or 27.2%; open, 332 or 26.6%; woods, 153 or 28.5%. Now for the Rebels. The South had 2016 men deployed over about the same frontage, 450 yards. The 140th NY overlapped the Rebels a little on the right, but the left, in the woods, saw the Rebels extended a little past the 20th ME's line.

In the open, the CSA deployed 1007 men over 200 yards, and in the woods, 1009 over 250 yards. Losses in open, 366 men or 36.6%; in the woods, 259 men or 25.7%. The first attack consumed no more than one turn, followed by a short pause, and then the second phase probably lasted two more turns. Considering that on both sides the men in the woods were engaged for only about two thirds as long (two turns instead of three, because of the 15th and 47th AL lagging behind the others) losses were even proportionally higher in the woods than on the open slope. I found it especially interesting to note that the Rebel losses broke down well into a roughly 12% per turn loss rate, despite terrain differences.

Treelines

I also searched for an action in which one side defended a treeline while the enemy assaulted across open fields, since comparison of such statistics would be the clearest proof of the validity of a woods modifier. So far, I have been unable to find such an action that fits the above requirements in order to provide clear analysis.

There is an interesting reverse example I found, in looking at the position of Thomas' Union 14th Corps at Chickamauga. Thomas' men were placed in a semi-circular line east of the Lafayette Road, around a large cleared field. The Union battlelines were placed well within the treeline, and the Rebel assaults also came through the trees, but the enemy was unable to fire on the cleared area and this greatly facilitated the shifting of Union reserves, etc.. That clearing was one of the major, if unheralded, strengths of Thomas' position.

In more general terms, I can find no evidence that the presence of trees in and of themselves had a significant and beneficial impact on losses. Both Chickamauga and The Wilderness were fought in largely wooded areas, and overall losses do not seem significantly lower than for other actions. It was far more common for troops to be deployed in open terrain wherever possible, even if a wooded area was close at hand, since command and control difficulties increased exponentially in even lightly wooded areas.

Having come all this way, however, I will bow to the inevitable and propose a woods modifier of sorts -- but not the one you were expecting. My reading in this regard has convinced me that the significant impact of woods was not in any defensive benefit, but rather the increased measure of confusion and loss of control they caused.

When any unit is fired on in the woods, I suggest that one be added to the straggler die roll, increasing the straggler loss accordingly. This is a purely optional rule, and simulates the much greater degree of disorganization to be found when fighting in the woods. In partial woods hexes, ignore the modifier since it can be assumed that the defending troops would form up in any available open terrain.

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Bloody Lane

A Scenario for In Their Quiet Fields

by Dave Powell

As our very first effort, ITQF suffered from two notable problems--only one major scenario, and no hex numbers. This article is an attempt to alleviate the first problem by giving you a couple of shorter scenarios to play with. In doing so, it runs headlong into the second problem. Please bear with the method of getting around that problem as presented here. Have fun.

In designing this short scenario covering the battle for the Sunken Road from 9:00 a. m. to Noon, 17 September 1862, I discovered that a more satisfying scenario could be had by starting the entire game with this later start. Both versions are included here.

In order to work around the lack of hex numbers, and declining to have you mark up your maps yourselves, the following method is used. From a given point on the map (usually farm or other buildings, at times other units or leaders already placed) you will be given a code such as "6h2" which means "direction six, two hexes." Directions are counted from 1 to 6 in a clockwise manner with direction 1 being due West. This is arrayed in the same manner as the Scatter Diagrams in TCS games, but with one pointing West.

Loss Chart Information

The following is the current set-up of the loss charts for the game, given that portion of the battle that has already occurred. To save space, the entire set of info is given here and only some of it will actually pertain to the smaller scenario. Fill out the loss charts as shown here for either version.

2x= Two casualties

2s= Two stragglers

Union

1/1/1 2x2s destroyed

2/1/1 2s

3/1/1 2x1s wrecked

4/1/1 4x1s

1/2/1 3x4s wrecked

2/2/1 2x1s

3/2/1 6x4s destroyed

1/3/1 2x3s

2/3/1 2x4s

3/3/1 2x3s

1/1/12 3x3s

3/1/12 4x5s

1/2/12 3x3s

2/2/12 1x2s

3/2/12 4x2s wrecked

Mansfield: Dead (Williams in command of 12th Corps)

Hooker: Wounded (Meade commands 1st Corps)

US Arty: 230

McClellan Points: 12

Committed Corps: 2nd and 12th Corps

US Casualties: 42

Confederate

H/H/1 5x1s

L/H/1 4x2s

C/DH/2 1x

M/DH/2 1x1s

R/DH/2 6x

E/EW/2 2x1s

H/EW/2 2x1s wrecked

L/EW/2 5x2s wrecked

T/EW/2 2x

J/J/2 1x

S/J/2 3x1s

Stwl/J/2 1x

T/J/2 2x1s wrecked

H/Cav 1x1s

L/Cav 1s

Lawton: Wounded, Repl placed in command.

CSA Arty: 130

CSA Casualties: 40

Small Scenario Start: 9:00 a.m. End: 12:00a.m.

Play is confined to the boudaries given by the corners:

Kennedy 2h3
Rowe/Cox 4h3
Newcomer 5h2
SD Piper 1h1 then 6h3

Union Set Up

Sumner, Sedgwick, 1/2/2 (col) DR Miller 6h3; 3m2 (col) from 1/2/2 4h1; 2/2/2 (col) from 3/2/2 5h1; Greene, 1/2/12 Dunker Church 3h3; 3/2/12, 2/2/12 from 1/2/12 5h1; 12b from 1/2/12 3h1; 12b from preceding 12b 5h1; Williams, 12 Corps HQ anywhere in East Woods; French, 3/3/2 Roulette 1h1; 2/3/2 from 3/3/2 3h1; 1/3/2 from 2/3/2 3h1; Richardson, 2/1/2 Clipp 4h1; 1/1/2 from 2/1/2 4h1; 2 Corps HQ, 2 Corps Supply (5 sp's), 3/12 w/i 1 Mumma 4h2.

Confederate Set Up

A/DH/2 Clipp 6h1 ex line to 5h1; DH Hill, Ro/DH/2 from A/DH/2 1h2 ex line to 4h1; R/DH/2 Dunker Church; C/DFV2 Dunker Church 4h1; Jackson, McLaws, K/M/1 Dunker Church 5h2; C/M/I Jackson 6h1; M/DH/2 Jackson 5h1; 1b Jackson 5h2; 1b Jackson 5h3; A/E Jackson 2h1; Rb Jackson 1h3; 2 Corps Supply (2 sp) Jackson 6h2; JR Jones, J/2 (all), 2b Jackson 2h4; 1 Corps Supply (4 sp) Jackson 5h4; Hood, H/1 (all) Reel 6h1; A/A/1 Reel 4h1; M/A/1 Reel 4h2; Longstreet, Anderson, P/A/1 Reel 4h4; F/A/1, Wo/A/1 Reel 4h5; 1b Reel 5h2; Walker, R/W/1 Reel 2h2; W/W/1 Walker 4h1; 1b Lutheran Church 3h4; W/A/1 Lutheran Church 3h5; Evans, E/E Lutheran Church 4h1 then 3h2; Repl Leader, L/EW/2, H/EW/2, T/EW/2 SD Piper 1h2 then 2h1; Lee, Rb Dunker Church 1h4; S/M/1 Lee 4h1; Rb Lee 2h1; Rb Lee 2h2; Rb Lee 2h2 then 3h1; B/M/1 Lee 4h1 then 5h1; E/EW/2 Lee 4h2 then 3h1 ex line 2h1 2b in both of the above hexes.

To Start the rest of the game from 9:00 a.m., add the following:

To the US Set Up:

1 Corps Supply (2 SP) Middlekauf; 1/3/1 Middlekauf Sh2; Repl, 3/3/1 Middlekauf 5h3; 2/3/1 Middlekauf Sh4; Ricketts, 2/2/1 Jos. Poffenberger 2h1; 2/2/1 Jos. Poffenberger 2h2; 1b Middlekauf 6h2; 1b Jos. Poffenberger 3h1; Meade, 1 Corps HQ Jos. Poffenberger 4h1;

4/1/1 Jos. Poffenberger 5h1; Doubleday, 2/1/1 Jos Poffenberger 5h2; 3/1/1 DR Miller

3h2; 1b DR Miller 4h1; 1/1/12 S. Poffenberger 1h4; 6 Corps Supply (5 SP) Pry Mills 4h2; Cav, A of Pot HQ, McClellan, Porter, 2x 2b (attached to 5 Corps), A of Pot Supply, 5 Corps HQ & Supply (5 SP), 3x Sb, 2x Db(2) Original Positions; 1/5 (all) w/i 2 Porterstown; W5, 1/V5 w/i 2 Middle Bridge (West of Creek); Sykes, 3/V5 Ecker 4h1;

Burnside, Cox, 9 Corps HQ Original Positions; VR/9 (attached to 2/9) H. Rohrbach 6h3; Sturgis, 2/2/9 2/K/9 2h1; 1/V9 21K19 2h2; 9b (-2) 9 Corps HQ 1h1; Wilcox, V1/9 9 Corps HQ 6h1; 9 Corps Supply (5 SP) 9 Corps HQ 5h1; 9b H. Rohrbach 5h3; 1/1/9 H. Rohrbach 1h1; Scammon, 1/K/9 N. Rohrbach 1h1; 9b 1/K/9 5h2; 2/3/9 from last 9b 6h1; Rodman, 1/3/9 from last 9b 6h2.

To CS Set Up:

ANVa HQ & Supply, R/Cav, Cb, Db(2, south of Lower Bndge), 1b(-2, west of Lower Bridge), K/JN/1, Db(2), D/JN/1, DR Jones, J/JN/1, P/JN/1 Original Positions; T/JN/1 w/i 2 of Lower Bridge, West of Creek; 1b(-2) w/i 2 of Luthern Church; Stuart, LtCav, Cb, H/Cav, Db(2) w/i 2 Nicodemus Hill.

In later issues of this magazine, I will present other small scenarios for this game the attack of 1st Corps and 9th Corps come to mind quickly. See you then.

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TCS Line Entry Command System

A Quick Variant

by Dean N. Essig

One of the problems of the TCS system is that even the player who is careful about creating only the op sheets he needs will still end up with quite a bit of paperwork to keep track of. While the existing system is an excellent simulation of the way things work in real life, the number of commands under the player's control can quickly overload the player's ability to keep up -- especially so without a staff of experts to do parts of the job for him.

This is especially true in monsters such as Omaha, so I'll offer a solution to the problem here -- the line entry command system. For the full-effect of the command system, I prefer to use the standard version and not this abbreviated one. Some players may want to use this all the time, others might when games require the control of many units.

To be fair, this system was based on a system I saw Dave Powell using in his Omaha playtests. Requirements here, other than an understanding of the original system, are: a sheet of lined paper per side, a pencil, and a little honesty. We all have the first two items, players without the latter should reconsider the type of games they are attempting to play.

This system is vaguely reminiscent of the one used in the CWB series. Basically, one line on the paper is devoted to each battalion task force and assets assigned there. So, the sheet can be filled out before play (line by line) so that less set up work is involved in the game itself.

The first entries on the line should be: Base Organization, attached units, size of force. In a game of Omaha it would be best (for the Americans) to make each line correspond to an infantry battalion and assign attached units/ figure size after the landing occurs. Otherwise you will spend forever trying to get your task forces together. The rules for attachment and detachment of units remain the same -- just switch line entries as needed.

The line looks as follows so far:

1/16/1 w/ 1 Plt A/741 Tnk Size 5

Next comes the honesty part. After the size, on the line, write a very quick statement of the mission of the task force (when, that is, you want to give it one.) Something like: Attack to capture village A. The details of this operation should be kept in mind (or jotted down somewhere if that isn't what you like.)

If you need more precision in your orders (so you can follow them or prove to your opponent that you were...) you probably should use the original system and avoid this simplification. Make the order statement part of the line when you wish to assign the mission, such as:

1/16/1 w/ 1 Plt A/741 Tnk Size 5: Attack to capture village A.

During following Command Phases, add up weighted points to the right of the order and make rolls nominally. When the order becomes implemented, erase the weighted tums and place a checkmark after the mission to show this. Conduct the mission as you planned it.

Using this system, an army the size of Omaha's can be managed with a minimum of paperwork -- leaving you to fight your battle and have fun. This system, a simplification of the original, contains many of the most important features while cutting down on "paper sheet confusion."

Battle Plans

For detailed battle plans, ones in which the player has some exact idea of how he wants the fight to go (as well as how he wants it done) or in multiple player games, the line entry system is not the right way to do it -- in these occasions use the original system. Certainly, a mix of the two methods (to take advantage of the benefits of both) can be done and would be the best way to play.

The variant I'm proposing here is an aid to speed up play and to make big games more manageable. Players who play an Omaha with the full command system are brave souls indeed and should be congratulated. The line entry system will make that game accessible to others (myself included, suffering as I do from fits of laziness when playing games.)

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TCS Multi-Fire/Roll Cumulative Chart:

by Rod Miller

Use this table for any multiple roll attack in which a given Hit Number must be obtained to kill. It saves greatly on time and helps cut probability limitations in the original. Players can use this table to save time with: AT Rolls, Artillery and Mortars vs. Point Targets, and AA fires. It can be used correctly with this or any other game in which a number of two die dice rolls must be made to hit a roll of 8 to 12.

TCS Multi-Fire/Roll Cumulative Chart

by Rod Miller

# Rolls=	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	
12	55	55	56	56	61	61	61	62	62	63	63	64	64	65	65	66	66	66/4*	12
11	23	23	24	25	26	31	32	33	34	35	41	43	44	46	52	55	61	64	11
10	12	13	13	13	14	14	15	16	21	22	23	25	31	33	36	44	52	61	10
9	11	11	11	11	11	12	12	12	12	13	14	15	16	22	25	33	42	53	9
8	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	12	12	13	15	22	31	44	8

Roll this number or greater to score a "hit"
 (* = Roll a 66 and then 4 - 6 on the "tiebreaker")

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Barren Victory

Designer's Preview

by Dave Powell

With the publication of **Barren Victory**, we return to our popular *Civil War, Brigade Series* system. To date, all efforts in the CWB Series have covered Eastern Theater battles, including Antietam, Gettysburg, and Second Manassas. **Barren Victory** takes us instead to the West, to Northern Georgia in September of 1863, for the Battle of Chickamauga.



It can be argued that the Western Theater was where the Civil War was won or lost, while notoriety remained focused on the struggle in Virginia. Only rarely did Confederate President Jefferson Davis turn his attention to sectors more remote from the capitol. Chickamauga was one of the few attempts by the South to adopt a western strategy, and one of the most fascinating battles of the War.

Designing a game set in the West was a lot of fun, especially as a change of pace. New leaders, new troops, and different (even unique!) command problems made **Barren Victory** an enjoyable project and, I think, an interesting game.

One of the most desperate battles of the war, potentially decisive for either side, Chickamauga is a natural game topic. After the disappointments of the Gettysburg campaign, the Southern leadership turned their attention to the deteriorating situation west of the Appalachian Mountains, where Federal armies had cleared the Mississippi, (severing Texas and Arkansas from the rest of the region) and now threatened Georgia. Here the South made its last solid bid to launch an offensive, concentrating resources from all over the embattled country to fight and win a decisive battle around Chananooaga.

Gathering of Might

In an unprecedented move, even Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was substantially weakened by the detachment of Longstreet's First Corps to the West, where it joined Braxton Bragg and the Rebel Army of Tennessee. Bragg was preparing to counterattack against Union General William S. Rosecrans, who had finally begun his own advance in the fall of 1863. Other troops joined Bragg from Mississippi,

reinforcing the Rebel army until it achieved something all too rare in Civil War battles: superiority in numbers over the Federals.

The two armies collided along the banks of Chickamauga Creek, in a heavily wooded valley between Missionary and Pigeon Mountains, eight miles south of Chattanooga. For two days, September 19th and 20th, the two armies fought with terrible ferocity and enormous loss. On the second day, it was Longstreet's command which struck the heaviest blow, and his attack forced the Union army back to Chattanooga on the verge of disaster. Only a gallant stand by Thomas and the 14th Corps held off the Rebels and allowed the army to escape greater defeat.

Opportunities

As a game topic, this fight presents some great opportunities. The Rebels have a slight superiority for a change, but both armies remain well balanced. Both sides have some ability to attack, and they both did, historically. It was Thomas' Federals who opened the fighting on the 19th, only to draw Bragg's response, bloody and desperate Rebel attacks all along the Union line.

Besides this natural balance, a whole crew of new personalities is introduced, and a set of command problems that make for some bizarre situations indeed. Bragg's relationship with his generals was abysmal, and greatly impeded the effectiveness of his army. Coupled with General Polk's disastrous failures at corps and wing command, the Rebel command team is a melange of incompetence. Longstreet's arrival, however, will change that.

With a magnificent display of tactical skill, he coordinated the powerful attack which finally drove half the Federals from the field. The Union army had similar problems, offset by their own star performer Thomas. This mix of extremes makes for some interesting special rules and utilizes the Series' commend rules to their utmost.

Mix of Scenarios

As for the game itself, I have tried to include a mix of scenarios, covering both balanced situations at the battle's opening as well as final Union efforts to extricate themselves from disaster. There are six scenarios in all, five shorter games of varying duration and the full battle game which lasts from dawn on the 19th until nightfall on the 20th. The shorter versions are set up chronologically to give glimpses of the battle in progress, focusing on important highlights or turning points in the action.

Scenario 1 covers the entire first day, from the initial skirmishing near Jay's Mill to Cleburne's inconclusive dusk attack. This situation takes on the feel of a meandering engagement, as both sides shift forces and bring on new arrivals to gain the advantage. It is an evenly balanced game, but one where the Rebels will curse their poor leaders. Careful Rebel play will allow for concentrated assaults, but only with

planning and foresight. The Union player, for his part, will find himself stretching to cover a long line with inadequate troops, and hurrying each reinforcement forward as it arrives.

Scenario 2 addresses the afternoon of the 19th, commencing at 2:00 p.m. with a strong Rebel attack delivered by Stewart's division. This assault historically punched through the Federal center, and threatened to send Rosecrans running a day early, until halted by fresh Union arrivals. The afternoon also brought Hood's attack on the Union line, which again threatened to penetrate their center. The bloodiest of the first day's fighting occurred within this time frame, and the scenario can be a real brawl. Perhaps, with better success, the Rebel can circumvent the need for a second day's fight at all.

Scenario 3 begins at dawn on the 20th, and covers all of the second day. Both sides' forces are massed and ready for action, and the Rebel Army of Tennessee has been altered into a wing organization to better utilize Longstreet's talents. Losses so far are relatively equal, with neither side having gained any significant advantage.

The first three short scenarios represent balanced, relatively equal contests. Scenarios four and five, however, focus on historical simulation rather than equality, and heavily favor the Rebels. They are designed to give the player some glimpse of the Union disasters of the 20th, and allow the gamer a chance to study this collapse and withdrawal in detail. They also provide an opportunity for gamers of differing skill levels to still play a competitive game, or for a veteran to introduce a novice to the system. The Federal player will definitely have his work ahead of him.

Scenario four opens with Longstreet's Wing assault. It starts at 11:00 a.m. on the 20th, and the Union set-up forces the Union player to contend with the infamous gap left in the Federal center by a series of misunderstandings between Rosecrans and a Union Division commander, Wood. Longstreet's troops roll forward in the most concerted attack yet mounted by the Southerners, and the Union troops must find a way to stabilize the situation before they are swept from the board.

In addition, Rosecrans is on the verge of panic, and must make a special die-roll check for this at the start of the scenario. Failure will trigger departures among several Union divisions, making the Federal task even more difficult.

Scenario five is not for the fainthearted Federal. It commences at 2:00 p.m. on the 20th, and Union panic is already triggered. The Rebel player must drive off the last Union forces (under Thomas) and secure as large a victory as he can. The Federal must hold on as long as possible and give the rest of his forces time to flee. This scenario is good for solitaire play, and also portrays the difficulties Thomas faced as he earned the sobriquet "Rock of Chickamauga."

The final version of play, scenario six, covers all of the battle. It is moderately long,

and takes a while to play. On the whole I think that it represents one of the most balanced games in the entire series, as far as situation goes. It allows the full impact of poor command and inadequate leadership to be brought home, especially for the Rebels, who struggle along with the likes of Bragg and Polk. Fortunately, each side has a first-class leader as well, Thomas for the Union and Longstreet for the South. Proper command play will see these two officers carrying the largest burdens of maneuver and combat, offsetting the inferior performances of their respective associates.

More Detail

Because of both the nature and the extent of the command problems the Rebels labor under, more detail is in order. Braxton Bragg, by the time the battle occurred, had completely lost the confidence of his subordinates throughout the army. Almost to a man, they distrusted his abilities and feared his motives. Only by the will of Jefferson Davis had Bragg remained in charge this long. As a result, almost everyone has anti-initiative ratings *vis-a-vis* Bragg, to the aggravation of the Rebel Player.

To further compound the confusion, Bragg took the unheard of step of completely revising his command structure on the night of the 19th-20th, to accommodate the arrival of Longstreet, fresh from Virginia and as of yet untainted by anti-Bragg opinions (this would change). Bragg reorganized his five infantry corps into two equal wings, one each under Longstreet and Polk, two of the three available Lt. Generals. (He completely bypassed the third, D. H. Hill, which probably further aggravated things.)

Unfortunately, this new structure, while allowing Longstreet to utilize his talents to the utmost, also amplified Polk's major shortcomings.

Longstreet had one of the best days of his military career, bringing a sense of order from the chaos and delivering the knock-out blow, the attack described in scenario four. Polk, however, was a complete disaster, quarrelling with his new subordinates (chief among them the slighted Hill) and proving himself unable to initiate anything larger than fruitless piecemeal attacks all day.

Command

The bulk of the game's special rules focus on recapturing this command situation, allowing the Rebel player to adopt the Wing structure when Longstreet arrives, if he so chooses. Of course, Longstreet's ability to lead six Rebel divisions (half the army) as if it were a single corps and his initiative rating of four are offset by Polk's incompetence, for the Rebel is forced to name Polk as the other wing commander. The trade-off is sometimes a tough decision, since Polk's influence will render the other half of the army much less effective, and may well have an excitable Rebel player foaming at the mouth by the last turns.

The Union command situation is less difficult, save that Rosecrans used Thomas' skill to its utmost and the Federal player can do the same here. Thomas can also, through attachments, command up to half of the Union army and is rated highly. The Union player should be quick to give Thomas all the troops he can handle, thereby creating a weapon of great power. The other two Federal corps commanders, Crittenden and McCook, are below average, but not useless.

Following the tradition of the rest of the series games, I have tried to present not only the course of events, but included as many possible 'might-have-been's as well. The two maps cover a broad sweep of ground, from Lee and Gordon's Mill on the south to Rossville on the north edge, more room for maneuver than any other tactical game on the battle has done so far.

The Union Reserve Corps, for instance, is on the map throughout the game, since the maps go far enough north. Players will find the action well centered, with plenty of elbow room, so to speak. The terrain itself is heavily wooded, and relatively flat along West Chickamauga Creek, running through the two maps. On both the east and west boundaries, the terrain grows hillier. The west edge especially trails off into the foothills of Missionary Ridge, creating some very rough country behind the Union position.

In addition to plenty of map space, numerous troop questions have been posed on both sides. Several more Rebel divisions, units which might have made the concentration but didn't (like half of Longstreet's Corps, for instance) are included. All in all, twelve more Rebel brigades can be added to the army, for an extra 17,000 infantry, and the Union troops can add up to six brigades as well. These options can be useful for studying historical alternatives, and are very handy for keeping the game fresh after repeated playing or as yet another tool for balancing differing skill levels between opponents, etc.

Discard Bragg

As an added bonus, Rebels have the option of discarding Bragg in favor of either Joseph Johnston, in the West at that time, or Lee himself, who was also sounded out about going west to lead the built-up Rebel forces, but declined the honor. Lee is an especially tantalizing option, and the power of his command I ability could well bring order out of chaos. Now, instead of asking 'what if,' why not find out? In short, I think that players looking for variety will be able to find it here.

A preview look at the Second Edition CWB rules rounds out the package. This preview will show what "changes" have been made. A better term might be adjustments. The margin of difference between good and bad commanders' reaction times, for instance, is now much greater, giving good leaders a much larger role to play. Players who learned to circumvent the old system will now have to place a much greater premium on prior planning. Normal order delay turns will be in the

neighborhood of 3 to 5 turns instead of 1 or 2. Initiative, too, has been modified, with successful rolls now more difficult to achieve. The net effect, I believe, will be a more accurate simulation of Civil War command problems and a more unpredictable game.

Barren Victory is an in-depth look at one of the Civil War's dramatic battles, and a lot of fun as well. I hope that gamers derive as much enjoyment out of playing the game as I did from designing it. The unusual command circumstances make it a 'natural' topic for the series, and a worthwhile addition to any game shelf.

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Omaha

Designer's Preview

by Dave Powell

D-Day. Normandy. No event is more remembered from WWII, nor more dramatic. The most ambitious amphibious invasion in history, it paved the way for the liberation of France and the final defeat of Hitler's Germany in conjunction with the relentless Russian horde. It was a military spectacle of epic proportions.

Nor has it been slighted by the game design community since commercial wargames first started to appear. **D-Day** was one of the Avalon Hill classics, back in the early '60's; games have appeared regularly since. So why, then, (you may ask) do The Gamers want to put out their own version of the battle?

Because in all this spate of publishing activity, no one has focused on one of the most critical aspects of the invasion: the landings themselves. Books and movie images have given us glimpses of what it was like to splash ashore on that June morning, dashing across a beach shrouded in smoke and churned up by the relentless fure of German defenders, but games have ignored this picture to examine larger aspects of the battle.

Room for One More

We decided that there was room for another D-Day game; one that spotlights the gritty details of getting ashore and staying there.

What's more, we had the perfect system, already very well received: The Tactical Combat Series (TCS), introduced by Bloody 110. At 125 yards to the hex, platoon level and 20 minutes to the turn, Omaha represents a game of ambitious scope for us. With four maps and almost 1700 counters, it will be a true monster, and the largest project we have attempted to date. It will faithfully recreate the initial landing period in the 1st Infantry Division's sector of Omaha Beach, for the first two days of the battle.

Ultimately, Omaha will link up with another game of similar size, to cover the rest of the 29th Division on the western half of Omaha, as well as the rangers around Pointe Du Hoc.

[Ed. Note: That game's production will be based exclusively on how well Omaha is received. If Omaha is mediocre seller, 29: Let's Go! will not be produced.]

Originally, Dean was supposed to design this game, but in light of his accident in June of 1990, it became apparent that time would become a pressing issue. Therefore, I assumed the design duties in midstream. Dean had already done significant work on the landing system and more general special rules, but all of the scenarios and most of the testing still lay ahead. In order to ensure that adequate time would be available to properly develop the project, we pushed its intended publication date back a few months, from June to October, 1991.

Detail

Omaha examines the landings in great detail, from the unlikely survival of the DD tanks, to the task of moving inland. The game starts on D-Day, 6:40 a.m. June 6th, and lasts until Noon June 8th, though there are several shorter situations. The focus of the game is for the Americans to get across the beach, and then secure a lodgement to protect the beachhead.

The German task is to prevent this occurrence. The action can be fast and furious, as the German attempts to halt the tide of U.S. troops being hurled at him. U.S. losses can mount quickly and, the American player must beware of excessive casualties, since this is another road to German victory.

First the Americans must land, and the U.S. player is given several options to choose from. He may elect to use the historical landing schedule provided in the game, (which provides a detailed picture of the U.S. forces as they actually arrived) or may instead devise his own landing scheme.

The force lands in three waves -- 6:40, 7:40, and 10:00 a.m.. After that, all U.S. troops must arrive via transport landings. The troops in a wave are assigned to boats (or boat groups, for the smaller craft) and must roll for both survival and scatter. The survival roll can range from easy to lethal, depending on the boat-type and cargo. Swimming DD Tanks and Dukws loaded with artillery are going to have an especially difficult time beaching, while it will be rare for an infantry laden LCA to go down. Scatter is where the real nightmare begins. Each beach (Fox Green, Easy Red, etc.) is subdivided into six sectors, and random die-rolls distribute arriving troops to wrong sectors and even wrong beaches at will.

Command Problems

This scatter brings into sharp focus the command problems inherent in amphibious operations. Units were trained extensively on their specific invasion tasks, and spent hours memorizing the features of their particular landing site. Unfortunately, the vast majority of forces touched down anywhere from several hundred yards to more than

a mile away from their proper beach sector. To better simulate this restrictive planning, orders in the game are keyed on sectors and the U.S. player will find at least 95% of any orders he has drawn up voided. (Never fear, there is provision to skip the unnecessary creation of Op Sheets, if you desire.) A unit that lands in the wrong place may not move off the beach to start attacking inland until it either gets new orders, or moves laterally along the exposed beach to find its correct sector.

There is a third method available: leaders. Leader counters land with the various troops and provide the motivation necessary to start moving inland. They are selected at random from the larger pool of commanders of the various battalion and larger size units, and are the real key to U.S. success. Leaders may use anyone within a certain command radius to start moving and fighting, regardless of orders. While they only stick around until noon on June 6th, they can be decisive.

No matter how quickly the U.S. player gets inland, he must still resolve himself to one thing; he will suffer heavy losses. The Germans, while thin on the ground compared to the U.S. hordes, will have their hands full firing everything that will shoot.

After the first wave lands, the German player may feel heartened, since it is smaller and unlikely to make much headway. As each successive wave touches down, however, he will feel the pressure of the relentless U.S. advance. There is only one thing he can do: Keep shooting.

A variety of scenarios examine various aspects of the landings, and the inland actions as well. The landings can be played in one, two and four map versions, using either the historical schedule or a new one devised by the U.S. player at the start of the game. There are two versions of the full game, one for the historical situation and one examining the impact of implementing Rommel's plan for deploying the panzers along the coast. In the latter, the rapid arrival of large elements of Panzer Lehr can throw quite a scare into the Amis.

All German reinforcements enter via a Variable Arrival Table, which keeps each game fresh. Each arriving unit will have its hands full, particularly in the afternoon of the 6th, when the U.S. starts to move inland in a big way. It will be a bloody and desperate battle for both sides.

Force Mix

One of the most interesting things about Omaha is the mix of forces each player commands. The German is especially blessed in this regard. Among his forces are two new unit types: pillboxes and rocket pits. The pillboxes tend to function as stationary tanks, but have both powerful AT guns and strong area firepower as well. With a defense of 6, they can absorb a lot of fire before being knocked out.

The rocket pits are one of those bizarre little weapons systems that the Germans seemed particularly gifted in creating. They are just as advertised, a hole in the ground with a rocket in it. The German has ten of these static units, which function like singularly inaccurate mortars. These are hardly Hitler's secret weapons, but who could resist their inclusion? (Historically the Germans had about 40 of these things placed on the bluffs above the beach, and reports of their usefulness are obscure at best.)

Of course, tanks, infantry, assault guns; they're all there, including the supremely powerful infantry platoons of Panzer Lehr's recon battalion. With firepower ratings of 15 (lots of MG's) woe to the American platoon that tangles with them at close range.

The U.S. OB was more traditional (familiar units, but plenty of 'em) but did lead us on some interesting little chases. One of the teapot tempests was over the arrival of the 1st ID's recon company, equipped with M8 armored cars. Finally, we obtained a copy of the Recon's After Action Report (AAR); it told us that the cars didn't land until June 10th. Sixty men (two platoons) did come ashore late on the 6th, though no one is clear on what they accomplished prior to the arrival of their vehicles. I'm sure someone will find a use for them. Numerous other little successes filled in the gaps, especially concerning the assault landings. Much research was needed to fill in those blanks.

Game Behind the Game

It quickly became apparent that there was a game behind the game here: the tremendous efforts of the American engineer forces to clear the beaches and turn a deserted, bullet swept beach into a major port overnight. The engineer brigade commanding this activity included over 12,000 men and 1,000 vehicles in its ranks (larger than many divisions) and its inclusion would have doubled the U.S. countermix.

Furthermore, inclusion of its vitally important but tedious job would have rendered Omaha one of the most boring games in history. Ergo, those of you out there dreaming of logistical glory must look elsewhere, this game abstracts the engineering functions in favor of the combat. Combat engineering functions have been factored into the effects of the regular infantry.

Having run through playtests several times now, I think that gamers will find Omaha readily playable, despite its size. Furthermore, the very scope of the game makes it great for team play. I hope that, once published, we'll hear from quite a few gamers who've joined the "Omaha Beach Club" (High surf, Hostile natives, No beer) and have their own stories to tell. *[Ed. Note: More on the Omaha Beach Club next time!]*

The AT Roll:

What is it?

by Dean N. Essig

After a recent review completely butchered the basis of the AT Roll -- in misinterpretation, misunderstanding, and plain confusion -- I was worried our players might be confused as to the AT Roll's purpose, etc.

The AT Roll, as it says in the rules, "reflect(s) the effect of infantry anti-tank methods -- short range rockets, burning gasoline, magnetic mines etc. It is a dice roll, *based on the cover provided by terrain*, needed to kill an enemy vehicle." That pretty much spells it out -- but still the reviewer's mind was blown that it was easier to kill a vehicle in a city at night, than in broad daylight in the open!

While I cannot believe more than a handful of you could be confused by this, and those by the dis-information provided by the one above individual, I'll explain further...

An AT Roll represents the action of a very few (very brave) individuals who go out from their platoon armed with, say, a magnetic AT mine. These men, then slip through the intervening terrain to their target, leap out at the unsuspecting vehicle, paste the mine on the side and escape. Their chances are directly (and not inversely) related to the abundance of cover, limitations of visibility, etc. Cities provide ample ways to sneak up on a vehicle, broad open fields do not.

With the above in mind, the dice rolls and modifiers on the AT Roll Table should make good sense, even if you disagree with the exact value arrived at.

For those looking for more detailed personal accounts of AT Rolls in real life, see:

The Forgotten Soldier. Guy Sajer. Brassey's. 1990.

War on the Eastern Front. James Lucas. Jane's. 1979. (Especially, chapter 3: "The Last Days of Tank Destruction Unit DORA II in Brandenburg during April, 1945." An outstanding chapter devoted to the SS AT Battalion DORA II at the end of WWII.)

Play Tips for the Civil War Brigade Series

Dice and Markers

Orders Sheet

We have found it easier to have complete order information (order status, arrival, etc and the actual order text) in one place on a single sheet.

Explanations of abbreviations:

ArvTme= arrival time of the order

Sendr= Sender of the order

Recvr= Receiver of the order

Mtd= Method (IPV, AO, AW)

T= Type (Complex or Simple)

F= Force (F-O, F- 1, F-2)

Val= the acceptance table value

Ordtype= Order type (div goal, corps order, initiative, etc)

ORDER = text of the order

Status = status of the order (accepted at 1200, etc; D 1 or D2, etc)

Play Aid Tips

Combat Resolution -- We roll all 6 dice to resolve a combat at one time to cut down on the time required to pick up dice, roll them, etc. This is done by placing 6 different colored dice in a plastic cup or "backgammon-type" roller and rolling all 6 at once. Our system is as follows:

2 Red dice= Combat table dice #

1 Green die="rounder" or kicker to round the 1/2 results

1 Yellow die= Straggler table die #

1 white, 1 brown= Morale check dice #

Should a leader be present and casualties taken, re-roll the red dice to check if they are killed/wounded, before checking the morale. (2 additional dice, coded by size or color could be added and roll 8, for this purpose). We resolve Close Combats by having the DEFENDER roll first, with the morale results applied after the

ATTACKER rolls his attack. The ATTACKER then rolls for his fire portion, with the morale check on the DEFENDER applied ONLY if the attacker had "passed" his morale check. This little system saves some time and makes combat resolution easier.

[Ed. Note: In using the above system, I was at first confused between the "kicker" and straggler dice -- insisting to use the wrong die for the wrong thing. I found that substitunng a very small red die for the green one made it simpler and harder to confuse.]

Coded Strength / Point Markers

To save on having to pick up stacks to examine the full strength of a unit or check exactly how many gun points are under that artillery unit, we "code" our numbers with different colored blank markers.

For fire strength, we use white markers to represent B fire levels, black or green or any color really to represent C fire level. No marker at all is placed for an A level. Further, at most we place only a single strength marker under each brigade (representing that brigade's maximum fire level out of that hex).

Thus, an AB level brigade would have no marker under it. The Loss Sheet shows the actual strength level, the on board marker the max fire level, extending line is done by adding another appropriate marker under the extended line marker. Not only does this reduce stack sizes, it prevents brigade strength on the board from being immediately discerned (or at least reasonably estimated).

For gun and supply points we use 4 different colored blank markers to represent the numbers:

orange = 4
yellow = 3
pink = 2
white = 1
(gradually "paling" out)
No marker means full strength of 5.

This coding system has made the "manual process" of playing the game much easier, since you can peek at the color marker to identify proper fire strength, and don't have to lift stacks while going "down the fire line".

These simple little things have made the CWB easier for us to play and served to make a really **great** game even more so.

Learning the Hard Way

Armor Bttn.-Infantry Div. Coordination during the Breakout of Normandy

*by Cpt. Richard S. Faulkner
Armor, July-August 1990*

As the 83rd Infantry Division's attack toward Sointeny began on 10 July 1944 the 2nd Platoon Leader of A Co., 746th Tank Battalion, started to worry. His platoon was attached to 2nd Battalion, 329th Infantry Regiment with orders to provide any support possible to the battalion. The 2-329 battalion commander had turned down the platoon leader's request for infantry to cover the tank platoon's exposed flank.

As the lone platoon maneuvered through the maze-like hedgerows of the French bocage country, the platoon leader's worst fears became reality. Without warning, well-concealed antitank guns opened fire on the American tanks at point-blank range. Within minutes, the 2nd Platoon had ceased to exist.

The experience of the 2nd Platoon is but one example of how the failure of light infantry and armor to work together led to high losses for both arms during the breakout from Normandy. Contrary to the popular image of American armor blitzing across France, the reality was a slow and methodical fight through the hedgerows of Normandy. This fight was a slugging match that required infantry and tanks to coordinate their efforts for mutual survivability.

The breakout from the beachhead quickly showed that both arms were ill trained, organized, informed, and equipped to meet this challenge. By studying the use of armor by the 1st, 9th, 29th, 30th and 83rd Infantry Divisions from 6 June through 31 July 1944, we can better understand the problems of combined light infantry and armor operations. All the infantry regiments of these divisions fought and moved on foot. Though not classified as light infantry during World War II, these units are very close in organization and tactics to the "light-fighters" of today's Army.

It is also important to understand the nature of warfare in the hedgerows. The hedgerows of Normandy are tall mounds of earth with impenetrable growths of trees planted on top. Norman farmers built the hedgerows to protect their fields from the ravages of the sea winds. Over time, the hedgerows grew into walls enclosing each small farm. The Norman countryside is crisscrossed by blocks upon blocks of these

natural fortifications. Though the landscape of Normandy is unique, it does provide examples of how infantry and tanks worked together in armor-limiting terrain.

Armor and Infantry Organization in 1944

One of the major problems encountered during the breakout from Normandy was that there were no armored units organic to infantry divisions. All separate tank and tank-destroyer battalions were corps assets, allocated by the corps commander depending on the situation and the mission. In theory, the corps commanders had enough tank and tank-destroyer battalions to attach one of each to every infantry division. However, tank losses following the invasion quickly drained the corps' ability to keep the infantry divisions supported with armor.

As a result, the existing tank battalions **constantly rotated** among the infantry divisions in contact. The majority of the tank battalions were attached to at least two different divisions during June and July. For example, the 746th Tank Battalion was attached to three different infantry divisions (the 9th, 83rd, and 90th) from 12 June through 16 July 1944.

These continuous rotations further weakened the corps' depleted armor assets, and prevented "habitual" attachment of specific tank battalions to specific divisions. These problems remained until the arrival of additional tanks allowed corps to maintain a "one-battalion-to-one-division" ratio, and a reserve.

Once an infantry division received a tank battalion, the division commander usually gave a tank company to each regiment. The regimental commander in turn would attach a tank platoon to each infantry battalion. The June 1944 *After Actions Report of the 745th Tank Battalion* stated that the best ratio for the attack was one platoon to each battalion, and in the defense, a pure company to the regiment as a counterattack force.

The habit of reducing the tank battalions to platoon-size elements left many battalion and company commanders without units to command. The loss of control by the armor commanders proved to be a problem without a real solution. The armor commanders became coordinators and advisors to the division and regimental commanders. Because the Norman terrain precluded the mass use of armor, the diffusion of tank power was easier for the armor commanders to accept.

One to a Company

The tank platoon attached to the infantry battalion was normally not split any further, though employment of one or two tanks to a company was not uncommon. Commanders quickly discovered that tanks deployed below the platoon level suffered increased casualties due to the lack of interlocking support. The tank platoon was usually attached to the lead company or maintained as a battalion reserve. The

infantry battalions used tanks mostly as mobile machine gun platforms to clear the hedgerows of enemy snipers and machine gun nests.

The infantry provided the tanks additional "eyes and ears" to locate and reduce antitank guns and mines in the thickly-wooded Norman countryside. As units became more battlewise, infantry company commanders often attached a rifle squad to their supporting tank platoons to provide the tanks direct flank security and route reconnaissance. When both the armor and infantry leaders understood the tactics and abilities of the other, the task organization worked extremely well.

Armor-Infantry Team Training

The major hindrance to tank-infantry cooperation was a lack of infantry and armor team training before the invasion. All infantry divisions were supposed to have received tank training in the United States as a part of their certification for overseas movement. Additional tank-infantry team training was to have been accomplished in England during preparation for the invasion. The amount and quality of training in both the United States and England varied greatly from division to division, but for the most part was less than adequate.

Training in the United States was hindered by shortages of tanks available to the infantry divisions. These shortages were due to arguments over the employment of tank battalions, and an Army policy of stockpiling tanks in Great Britain for the invasion. The argument over the employment of the tank battalions was based on whether to gather all tanks into armor divisions, or to leave some tanks available to infantry divisions from corps pools.

The solution was a compromise that decreased the number of tank battalions in armor divisions to free up tanks for the corps. The tank battalions released from the armor divisions were not available to the infantry divisions for training until late 1943, too late for most of the divisions in the Normandy campaign.

Armor and infantry training in Great Britain also proved to be poor. Training in the infantry divisions tended to focus on the assault of the beaches, rather than tactics for the breakout. No one seems to have given much thought to the problems of operating in the hedgerows.

Many of the infantry regiments that would fight in Normandy received only cursory armor training in Britain. The only combined arms training the 747th Tank Battalion received consisted of "taking infantry for tank rides on the Devon Moors."

Ill-Prepared

Armor and infantry team training did not cease with the unit's deployment to combat. Real bullets and casualties quickly showed how ill-prepared infantry and tank units

were to work together. When possible, the corps and division commanders pulled units out of the line for tank team training. The 747th Tank Battalion, for example, was pulled out of combat from 20-28 July 1944 to practice reducing hedgerows with units from the 29th Division. This type of training was common throughout June and July as units developed their own tactics to deal with situations for which they had not been prepared.

The lack of combined arms training before the invasion greatly contributed to the high losses in tanks and infantry. The American soldier in Normandy received the majority of his tank-infantry training through the school of hard knocks. Combat proved to be the catalyst that welded the two arms into an effective fighting team.

Early Problems With Tank Infantry Coordination

Lack of Cohesion and Team Building.

During the Normandy Campaign, the tank battalions were unable to effectively fit into the infantry divisions' organization because the divisions did not "own" the tank battalions that supported them. Effective working relations and operating procedures were difficult to establish when the divisions were constantly changing tank battalions. Personnel turnover and the incessant use of the tank battalions, further aggravated this problem. A soldier of the 743rd Tank Battalion observed,

"A tank company might work with one infantry regiment one day and another regiment the next, but it was always working, always moving ahead on an attack, or remaining on the alert in an advanced road block or defensive position."

The overall result was poor cohesion and team-building between the tankers and the supported unit. These problems would remain until late 1944, when additional tank battalions allowed semi-permanent attachments of armor to all infantry divisions.

When infantry divisions were finally allowed habitual relationships with their tank battalions, cohesion problems tended to go away. The 1st Infantry Division was unusual in that it had the 745th Tank Battalion attached to it from June 1944 to the end of the war. The 1st Division habitually attached tank companies and platoons to specific regiments and battalions. The men found that the "permanent attachments of tank platoons to battalions increased the respect for capabilities of the other." The tankers of the 745th began to feel that they were part of a team, and responded with greater loyalty to the infantrymen whom they supported.

Communications Problems

Communication between tanks and infantry was the major technical problem of the combined arms team. The radio sets issued to infantry platoons and companies would

net only limited frequencies with tank radios. "Walkie-talkie" squad radios were ineffective in infantry-armor operations because of static produced by the tank engines.

Infantry leaders had to climb on the tanks to talk to the tank commanders. Because the tanks buttoned-up in combat, the infantryman had to first beat on the tank to get the tank commander's attention. This proved to be a dangerous and inadequate way of transmitting orders under enemy fire. Early use of hand and pyrotechnic signals met with only limited success. These type signals were difficult to see and understand from a buttoned-up tank in close terrain.

Inventive American soldiers provided many solutions to the communications problem. Tankers of the 743rd Tank Battalion linked field phones to their vehicles' intercom system. The field phones allowed the infantry leaders to pass on instructions without exposing themselves to enemy fire. All tank battalions in Normandy eventually developed similar systems. These systems worked well as long as the infantry could keep close to the tanks.

When the tanks received an independent task to accomplish, communications again broke down. The communications problem was completely solved when additional infantry-type radios became available in July for installation in the tanks.

Lack of Tactical Understanding Between the Arms

The greatest problem encountered in tank-infantry operations in Normandy was the failure of both arms to understand the tactics and employment of the other. This problem was a direct result of the tank battalions not being organic to the divisions for training and combat. A 1st Army after-action report stated, "Many of our infantry commanders do not possess sufficient knowledge of the proper employment of tanks as an infantry support weapon, and insufficient opportunity is given in the infantry division in training to become familiar with, and work with, the separate tank battalions."

Armor leaders, in turn, did not understand the mechanics of working with the infantry and could not advise the infantry commanders. On the battlefield, this lack of understanding would cause undue confusion, casualties, and lost opportunities.

Many infantry commanders tended to use their attached tanks and tank destroyers as nothing more than mobile pillboxes. If infantry commanders subscribed to the mistaken idea of armor invulnerability, the other extreme was to use tanks in unsupported attacks.

Experience showed these tactics to be a great waste of a limited resource. The infantrymen and tankers soon found that no advance was possible without close coordination and support. Each had to explicitly rely on the abilities and firepower of

the other to survive. Unfortunately, this proved to be a lesson that had to be painfully relearned by each new division that landed in Normandy.

The tank battalions were not without their share of tactical misconceptions. The tankers had conducted a majority of their training as part of a whole battalion or company. Armor officers, remembering the French mistake of parceling out tanks to the infantry in 1940, were reluctant to support the infantry divisions. Both officers and men had come to think of tanks as weapons that used speed and mass to break through all enemy resistance. Working in the hedgerows with the infantry forced the tankers to re-examine their concepts of armored operations. Many tankers learned the hard way that unsupported "blitz" attacks through hedgerows were a fast way to win Purple Hearts.

As combat experience grew, infantry leaders relied more on the input and judgment of the armor commanders. The 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions, both veterans of campaigns in North Africa and Sicily, rapidly assimilated their tank battalions, and had fewer problems with tank-infantry cooperation. An officer in the 1st Division pointed out, "It was found most important to have a platoon leader's recommendation prior to an attack, since he was much better qualified to determine routes of approach."

The 29th, 30th, and 83d were "green" divisions with little experience in armor operations. The failure of these units to learn from the mistakes and lessons of others was best illustrated in the burning tanks and dead American soldiers that dotted the Norman countryside.

The 30th Division's 14-15 June attack toward the Vire-et-Taut Canal was slowed by regimental and battalion commander's hard lessons in previously supporting the 29th Division. One infantry battalion S3 ordered a tank platoon of the 747th Tank Battalion, though out of ammunition, to support an attack to keep up the morale of the infantry.

Overcoming the Problems

Early attempts at unsupported attacks by both branches proved costly. Tanks trying to climb over the hedgerows exposed the vehicles' chin belly armor to close-range antitank fires. The tanks could not move until the infantry could not destroy the antitank guns because the tanks could not suppress the enemy machine guns. The solution was to breach the hedgerow so the tanks could get to the flanks or rear of the enemy before antitank guns could respond.

American soldiers quickly improvised methods of accomplishing this task. When they found the use of demolition charges alone ineffective, the soldiers hit on the idea of attaching two poles to the front of the tanks to bore holes in the hedgerows. This device allowed them to place the demolition charges deep inside the hedgerow.

Once the breach was made, the tanks and infantry would rapidly move in and secure the objective. The drawback to this method was the time it took to make the breach, and the dust kicked up from the explosion often alerted the enemy to the attack.

Sgt. Culin is credited with discovering that plow-like teeth welded to the front of the tanks enabled the vehicles to push directly through the hedgerows without stopping. These devices became standard equipment for tanks until the end of the campaign.

Another problem to overcome was the difference in mobility between the tanks and the infantry. Infantry training did not include moving troops quickly around the battlefield to exploit success or fight off counterattacks. The infantry regiments depended on the truck companies of the division for most long-range movement. When terrain became more open, the tanks were still restricted by the movement of the foot soldiers, because the truck companies were not considered a combat asset.

To overcome this problem, the infantry often rode directly on the tanks for exploitations and hasty movements. The 9th Division's 60th Infantry Regiment and 746th Tank Battalion used this technique with great success during the 16 June attack on Reigneville. Other units went as far as mounting infantry squads on tanks for assaults on hedgerows. This tactic was risky, but could provide a good mix of tanks and infantry at critical locations during an attack.

Normandy is also dotted with small towns and some fairly large cities. Narrow city streets could be more dangerous to tanks than the worst hedgerow. In small towns, the tanks would move under close infantry support and provide "bunkerbusting" fires. In the cities, the infantry commanders would use some armor for close support, but would leave the majority of the tanks to cut off enemy retreat and reinforcements. The use of armor to cover the escape and counterattack routes was decisive in the capture of St. Lo and Cherbourg.

Summary

The Normandy campaign illustrates how infantry and tanks worked together in armor-limiting terrain. The breakout from the beaches proved that proper organization, training, and knowledge is essential for tank-infantry cooperation.

The Organization of forces during the campaign did not provide adequate armor support to the infantry divisions. Because the tank battalions were not organic to the divisions, the building of teams and cohesion was hindered. It is also clear that training did not place enough emphasis on tank-infantry teams before combat.

This lack of training prevented both arms from understanding the tactics and employment of the other. Both tankers and infantrymen were forced to gain a working knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the other before they could make progress. Even with these difficulties, American soldiers were able to

improvise to solve most tactical problems. Survival compelled the two arms to work together and exchange ideas.

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In Brief

Editorial

by Dean N. Essig

Welcome to the first issue of *Operations*. I suppose something of an explanation is in order. We felt a natural need to support our own products and were somewhat disappointed with efforts in their support outside our own control -- we needed a consistent, accurate, and responsible voice to provide our customers with the latest news, revisions and discussion on the how and why of our own games. You must forgive us for being forward enough to do this, but, at least, I believe you understand why we did it. I hope we can provide you the product you deserve.

To do this, we need your help. Support in the form of subscriptions would be one way. This magazine is designed to support itself, period. You and I both need no reminding of the importance of subscribing to support a magazine and I will not belabor the point.

Next, second only to subscriptions, is writing. This is to be a *player supported* support magazine. I need your articles -- your tips and tricks, your play strategy, your views on whatever. For those inclined away from formal articles, your letters to the editor will be welcome and published (if you don't tell me otherwise) hopefully inspiring a readers forum debate -- the content of which will be only limited by your imagination, a little "good taste editing" and space availability. I will never intentionally edit your comments in such a way as to change their thrust or meaning as I've seen elsewhere.

You say you don't have the time or desire to write either an article or letter? Ok, how about dropping me a line on what you would like to see an article about, but don't have the time to put it together yourself. Since you know what you want to see, you are the best judge of the desired subject and approach -- let me know what you want to read about.

Ok, the what we want and need stuff is out of the way. What do you get out of it? To begin with, we will give you an intelligent forum for examining gaming products and their play. With both examples of play and discussion of the reasons behind rules, players should gain a deeper understanding of the products. The goal is that increased understanding will lead to greater enjoyment.

Also, you will get a look at systems under development so you can interject your views *before* publication -- giving all of us a more satisfactory product. All of this is meant to apply to other company's products as well, although we can only speak with authority about our own. We, of course, cannot claim to be unbiased, so product reviews are not to appear in these pages. If a particularly noteworthy product appears from another company, I will comment on it and give a short description of what I see as its good points. It is neither our right, nor goal to criticize the work of other companies. This is not a review magazine. I hope other game companies take advantage of these pages to help their products and gaming in general.

As I've stated before, this magazine will not accept any advertising other than announcements of our products and services. We do, however, wish to publish the names, addresses and phone numbers of game stores (free of charge) in every issue. This is provided as a service to both the stores and the gamers. Game stores are notoriously hard to find. If you know of a local game store that could use a free plug, tell them to drop me a note.

Thank you for your interest in this magazine. With your input and help, I hope to interject a good amount of life back into a beast announced as DOA by others our hobby!

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OutBrief

No Recruiting

Dean N. Essig

This section is designed to give some last thoughts on gaming and to direct your attention to the future.

Let's get one thing straight. Something all of you players out there know, but some people just can't get on the same wavelength about. Wargamers do not need to be harassed about anything -- this is a hobby. People have hobbies for one reason -- to have a little fun with their free time. Face it, this hobby cannot die if at least one of you is still in his garage late at night playing some old game.

Maybe it would shrink so far as to not support a manufacturer -- distributor -- retail system, but there would still be the small mail order game house to supply you with games. If no new games are being produced which are good enough to support a game company, then tough. Improve or die. Wargame companies are not, and should not, be exempt from basic laws of business.

My point isn't very deep or philosophical, only that gamers are in this to have fun. We do not need lectures about recruiting, style of game to like, or that we should support game companies, irrespective of their bad products or track record. I got my fill of recruiting lectures in the military (recruit or die...it will show up on your OER... mandatory "this officer support recruitment" remarks) and I need none in my hobby. Sure, we can always use more gainers, but not so much that we should scare away those already playing.

What's with this one man campaign to bring on games about Low Intensity Conflict, anyway? I can see interest in Alternative History (unpalatable, but honest) easier. I've got a news flash, LIC is boring -- no matter how modern or "in" it might be. Such games really need a hidden movement or blind system (or the guerrilla leader will find his clock getting cleaned much of the time) and these systems fail miserably solitaire. And, another flash, I play solitaire most of the time, too. So lay off, and put this effort into something productive.

Those are my thoughts, anyway. Before I close this column, I wanted to encourage you to start designing. We can put out up to 6 games a year, but will only do that if we have good ones to release. With just Dave and I designing, I don't feel safe with

trying on more than 4. If that's is all you need and you are happy with the range of topics we are hitting, ok.

If you have any complaint, the easiest way to fix it is to design a game which hits your favorite topic. The SCS system will be good for that because it is not scale or time period dependent. It could even be used for an Ancients game... Anyway, the point is that Dave and I are limited in our expertise, and will not be designing games outside of that realm -- simply because they wouldn't be good enough. If you want something radically different from what we've been doing, you'll need to get to work!

I hope you have enjoyed this first issue of *Operations*. It was short a section because it was the first issue -- Letters to the Editor. Be sure to write up your opinions for next time. We will make every effort to print up your letters promptly with only a small amount of good taste editing. Send or call in your rules questions. That column burns through a lot of questions in each issue and we will always need more. Send in your articles or ideas for articles.

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Up & Coming

Product News

by Dean N. Essig

Barren Victory. The Battle of Chickamauga *Civil War Brigade Series #4*. Dave Powell. This game (see article this issue) is all but finished and will be available at Origins in Baltimore.

Omaha. The 1st Infantry Division's Assault on D-Day, *Tactical Combat Series #3*. Dave Powell with some minor assistance from myself. This monster is still on track for October, 91. See preview article in this issue. Work proceeded rapidly after I was dethroned as designer by my injuries (grumble, grumble) and Dave has done his usually area job in putting my loose ends into a tight package.

Bloody Roads South. The Battle of the Wilderness, *Civil War Brigade Series #5*. Jim Epperson. Jim is our first "outside" designer. His work will be gone over with a fine-tooth comb this summer and the game will provide the first ever brigade level treatment of this very interesting battle. Due for release April, 92.

Guderian's Blitzkrieg. This is the first *OCS* game (see below) on the drive on Moscow, the right wing of Army Group Center, Oct 21 -- Dec 21, 1941. The maps for this one (two that is) are being done right now. OB work is preceding a pace. I need a hand from the East Front students out there -- aircraft, weird rear area units, supply line and dump data. If you are interested in helping -- give me a ring. Due for release Origins, 92.

Stalingrad Pocket. The first *SCS* game. This was originally submitted by a player in Japan using a slightly different system. He gave us the go-ahead to re-format it into the *SCS* rules. The game covers the first Soviet counteroffensive in the winter of 1942 and the creation of the 6th Army pocket in Stalingrad. Due for release Origins, 92.

Perryville. The Battle of Perryville, *Civil War Brigade Series #6*. This game with one map and 1/2 a countersheet (280 counters) is designed for the player who wants a *CWB* game that takes up little space & can be played quickly. It is in playtesting at this time. Due for release October, 92.

Blood of Generals. The Battle of Franklin and potential Battle of Spring Hill, *Civil*

War Brigade Series #7. Like **Perryville** this game is for those with little space or time. It affords the player the ability to examine the what-if aspects of the botched Spring Hill Affair. Also, it allows a close look at the effect of army commanders on drugs... Due for release October, 92.

Napoleonic Brigade Series. Now that the rewrite of 2nd edition *CWB* is done (thank goodness), work can proceed rapidly on this new series. The groundwork was laid by Dave Powell quite some time ago (fall, 1987 to be exact) and only now has everything fallen into place to allow us to finish it up. If any of you have a favorite Napoleonic battle you'd like to see first let me know (Waterloo is out for now...) The first release in this series is scheduled for Origins, 93 on the Battle of Austerlitz.

Operational Combat Series. I've been working up this one for quite a while now, and I think its final form is coming close. It is a battalion through division depiction of air and land combat from, say, 1900 to 1950 (missiles, whether SAM or otherwise, mess it up.) It has been undergoing a massive playtest for months now (using an otherwise unplayable Nonh Africa game as a test bed) and things look good. The system is designed to be fairly simple to play, yet with enough "depth" to entertain the true hard-core out there. I hate it when games, to be simple, abstract fairly important features of warfare -- in a way that makes their importance invisible to the play. Pet peeve, you see.

Standard Combat Series. This series is designed for those who do not care for the complexity levels of our other games. It uses a straight-forward game system you all could play at the drop of a hat -- the one most of us cut our teeth on in the Seventies. State-of-the-an? Irrelevant, it wasn't designed to be pan of any such rat race. It uses a basic odds combat results table, trace supply, Move-Fight-Exploit sequence. This series was designed with both veterans and novices alike in mind -- for when time and complexity decide for a player what he is willing to play.

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Game Rating Chart

Explanation

by Dean N. Essig

This chart is provided for your interest and use as a purchasing guide. It will represent the accumulated opinion of gamers as to the value of the listed games.

It is not, due to its sample population, unbiased. However, for those who vote, it will be accurate. Every game is available to be re-evaluated whenever you like (as long as the Rating Chart Rules are followed.) Therefore, if game X has either too high or low a rating, you can send in your opinion. This is added to those before you and divided by the total number of votes a game has gotten to give a new rating. A simple weighted adjustment. This should help keep the rating current. A game will not be included on the chart if it has less than 25% of the average number of votes per game. Games without enough votes to make the chart will be listed.

We will only ask for two specific ratings per issue. These will usually be new games not yet listed on the chart. The remaining spaces on the sheet are for your use (as well as any additional paper you wish to use.) You may vote for as many games as you like.

The games are rated as an overall item for the simple reason that we cannot take into account everyone's opinion of what makes a good game. To list a few categories to use as parameters doesn't work because it makes the categories of equal weight and no one has any ability to determine otherwise. Besides, if you are told to rate a game according to factors X, Y and Z, but you know that what makes a good game is box color, not X, Y or Z, how can you rate it correctly? This is an extreme example to be sure, but I feel it illustrates the right point.

Your views cannot, and should not, be constrained by someone else. By having the rating free-form, you are free to rate base on what you think is important.

Why no requirement to play the game? If you are like me, you won't try to play games you don't like. Does this mean you cannot voice that opinion on what you do not like? I should hope not. If more players like subject X than Y, X will get more and better votes than Y. Is this fair? Maybe not, but it more accurately represents the voting population.

People are generally unable to properly rate things on scales of much greater than 5, say 10. Therefore, we opted for a 1 to 5 scale, with its subjective definitions of good and poor. I think the differences between a 7 and an 8 on the usual scale are too subject to chance. I want games that are rated by player's according to their opinion of the game, not thier interpretation of the scale values.

Finally, a plead for sanity. I want you to vote on any game whose rating "seems" wrong, but I want you to vote by the rating you think it should be. Please do not vote by only using 5 or 1 to push the rating one way or the other.

I look forward to future issues and the adjusting ratings of games as time goes on. I, like most of you, am very curious about the interrelationship of the assorted game products out there and which ones are most (least) liked. This initial chart was based on a small group I could call, write, or otherwise pester. I look forward to hearing your views and tabulating your votes.

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Question and Answer

Civil War Brigade Series

Should the Up Slope movement penalty be used for units moving along roads? Ditto for extreme slopes?

Roads negate all terrain features for units moving along them, assuming the moving units are eligible for road movement benefits i.e. in column, etc.

How does a commander regain control of a division action under divisional goals?

If the division again re-enters command radius of the Corps HQ, the player may automatically revert the division to normal control, if he so desires. If this cannot happen, the corps commander must go "fetch" the division, in effect issuing another divisional goal to return to the corps, or the army commander may issue an order (which must then go through acceptance) for the same effect.

In terrain effects, an infantry unit in line has a cost for crossing a slope and for entering a higher elevation, are these cumulative?

No, the higher of the two is used (if a difference exists), but they do not add together.

If a unit receives a 1/2 combat result, which then rounds down to zero, it must take a Straggler check. Does it also make a Morale Check?

Yes, the unit must make both checks.

If two units fire at a given target, one is low ammo, the other is firing up a slope, is the Fire Table shift two or one?

A slope only affects a fire combat if all fires into the hex cross slope hexsides. So, only one column shift is in order.

If a supply wagon is overrun by enemy units is it destroyed or captured? If so, is it ever returned to play? Are wagons subject to loss if fired upon?

If overrun by enemy units, supply wagons are destroyed and not resumed to play. Wagons have one step and may be engaged with fire combat. They suffer no adverse formation (they are not limbered or in column), or facing effects (they front all hexsides.)

What is the minimum strength needed to support an extended line?

To have one, a unit must have at least a B fire level. This splits into two C's.

A few Disorganized units are on a target. Are their Fire Points halved as individuals or as a sum?

They should be halved as a total (or, halved separately maintaining fractions until added.) Always round these down.

What's the proper order of resolution in a fire combat? Since, a leader's death may make a difference.

The proper order for resolution is: Fire Combat Table -- Straggler Table -- Leader Check -- Morale Table. Therefore, if a leader dies or a unit becomes wrecked through stragglers, it impacts the morale check.

Is a Blood Lusted unit required to make Close Combats?

No. Blood Lusted units are generally very useful for close combats, but such use is not required in any way.

I sent orders from the army commander to the corps leaders. Do they issue orders to their divisions?

Generally, no. In certain games with a Wing or Grand Division structure such may be the function of the leaders at those levels. Once a corps leader accepts an order, the corps (or those parts available, anyway) follow the orders given the corps without extra work or hesitation.

Ok, if I sent orders to a corps which were delayed, can I then use initiative to get them anyway?

No. In the first edition this was not explicitly stated, in the second it is. Be that as it may, this is a method used to avoid the command system and is not the correct way to play the game.

Question and Answer

TCS Series Rules

Why does a tank platoon cost the same in size modifiers as an infantry company? I would think the tankers could be ready faster than the infantry.

The reason for this seeming incongruity is that abstracted into this size differential is the maintenance and logistical considerations of the tankers. The tanks need to re-arm and refuel frequently. Instead of burdening the player with these details the game does them for you whenever tankers are "between missions. "

An infantry platoon is destroyed via the Fire Combat Table or through SYR disintegration. In which case is a +2 added to the company morale, or both?

Only infantry platoons destroyed due to Fire Combat Results on the Fire Combat Table add the +2. SYR losses, AT Rolls, Artillery/ Mortar vs Point Target Tables do not add this, ever.

A stack of six units is moving along and triggers overwatch fires. How many times do we roll to determine permission, etc.?

Only once. Basically you are overloading the defender's with targets. They cannot fire, observe and adjust fast enough to engage more than a few of the herd of tanks to their front before the targets disappear.

When calculating the modifier for the morale check from the Fire Combat Table, is the "total steps lost" referring to the platoon checking morale or the entire company?

The steps the unit checking counts, not the whole company.

What mode is a suppressed or paralyzed unit considered to be in for Terrain Effects when fired upon?

It is still considered to be in the mode it was in under the suppressed/paralyzed marker. The idea is that the troops are now pinned down where they were and are still as protected or exposed as they were before being fired upon. If in move mode, this means the troops are prone, under fire, in the open or

wherever else they landed when they hit the dirt. They are just as protected or unprotected as they were when they started because they can't move to change the situation quickly.

If a carrier is destroyed using Area Fire, do the passengers still get the bonus to their defense?

No. When the carrier is destroyed, it is removed from the map and the troops are considered to have dismounted.

An infantry unit can make as many AT Rolls as it wants during the Suppressive Fire Phase. Can more than one AT Roll be made against a given target if more than one "firer" is available?

No. Only one such roll per target, per phase is allowed.

Is it within the spirit of the command rules to allow a unit conduct a diversionary attack away from the main objective?

Sure. As long as it is recorded on the op sheet as such. In fact a slick plan would be to take a round-about route, launch a diversionary attack, then move on the real objective all as part of the same operation. Such plans tend to work particularly well against players who try to react to everything.

Must a player identify the exact observer at the time of writing up an artillery fire mission?

No. But once the mission starts, he should identify the unit taking responsibility for firing the mission and from that point on, only that unit can observe and adjust fires.

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TCS Addenda -- Errata

29 Jan 91

In response to a well written and thoughtful article by Mr. John Kisner critiquing the TCS's handling of armored combat and overwatch fires, I propose the following changes to the basic system rules. While I am inclined to disagree with the size of the effect of these changes with Mr. Kisner, I can agree they are warranted to a greater or lesser degree. Players who feel the original system's handling of armored warfare to be inadequate should apply these optionals.

The rules for "minor weapons differences" here are the same as those in an earlier errata sheet. They have been resurrected for the sake of one player who wrote and asked what had become of them in the second edition rules. They were dropped as I felt very few players used them and that they seemed to add so little to the game -- they return here (again) for those who do wish to use them.

Errata to the Second Edition TCS Rules

Oops! The Mortar and AT gun symbols are still switched in the Weapon Unit types diagram on the top of page 3. You-know-who forgot to switch them when the 2nd Ed went to press...

8.9 Overwatch Fires (Simplification addenda, Optional)

To simplify the die roll procedure, add the following to the given rules... ...A roll for *Permission to Fire* is as follows. On a 5, overwatch fire is allowed by units which are not overwatch marked as desired. On a 6, roll another die.

This roll is the number of overwatch marked units that may fire in addition to any non-marked units the player desires to fire. When automatic permission is granted (range 3 or loss) a permission roll of 6 is assumed and a roll automatically made to determine the number of marked units that may fire in addition to the unmarked one. All other overwatch rules are in effect. The additional roll per overwatch marked unit is dispensed with.

12.5 Mode Change in Movement (Addenda, Optional)

Vehicle and carrier units (only) may change mode during movement. Such units may change mode at a 1/2 cost of their movement allowance. This mode change may be

made at any point in their movement as long as the required movement points are still available. Units that are overwatch marked and switch mode have the marker automatically removed. Mode change during the Mode Determination Phase is unchanged.

8.8g Minor Weapon Differences (Optional)

This rule gives life to the minor steps of weapons difference between +2 and -2 on the Point Fire Table. It is not recommended for play, unless a given player is particularly concerned about such things. This rule has no effect on Point Fire Table columns other than +2 to -2.

Attack - Defense					
Dice Mod	+2	+1	0	-1	-2
-1 on...	-	-	1	1-2	1-4
0 on...	1-2	1-4	2-5	3-6	5-6
+1 on...	3-6	5-6	6	-	-
One Die					

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Individual Game Errata

(26 May 91)

1-01 In their Quiet Fields, 2nd Edition

1. M/DM/2 should be M/DH/2 on the counter.
2. 1/3/2 and 2/3/2 are over-stacked in the initial set up. Place 1/3/2 in any adjacent hex.
3. A number of Loss Charts were shipped which were improperly printed. If you do not have both Union and Confederate Loss Charts, let us know and we will replace your sheet with a correct one.

1-02 Thunder at the Crossroads

1. There are no Corps-level anti-initiative ratings for either side.
2. There is no Entry Hex I. In all cases, the Union player gets points for Controlling Entry Hex H, instead.
3. The Confederate player gets 10 VP for entry Hex E (not F) and 5 VP for Entry Hex F (not G).
4. Each wrecked Union Cavalry Brigade is worth three (3) VP's, not one.
5. Current Strength Chart
 - S/J/2 strength on 3rd and 4th days is 14, not 10.
 - Stwl/J/2 strength on 3rd & 4th days is 10, not 14.
 - B/Heth/3 strength on 2nd, 3rd, & 4th days is 8, not 9.
 - A/Heth/3 strength on 2nd & 3rd days is 9, on 4th day is 5.
6. Loss Chart corrections: 1/1/1 -- is missing five strength circles.

(Note: this error is on the original, two-color loss charts only. Later loss charts, all in black, have corrected the error.) 2/1/3 should have an original strength of 22, not 12.

7. Union Arrival Schedule: At 12 noon July 2, Gregg and 1/2/Cav arrive with 1xCb, not 3xCb.

8. Confederate Arrival Schedule: In order to correct a game imbalance, allow the Rebel army supply train to arrive at 4:00 p.m. July 1, with Anderson's Division. This holds from both the Jackson Lives and historical orders of arrival.

9. Jackson Lives Scenario: Two new divisions are created in this scenario, Ew/2 and LD/2. Their wrecked levels are as follows:

Ew/2 0/0

LD/2 00000/0

1-03 August Fury

1. If for any reason a newly arriving unit finds its entry area blocked by enemy forces, it may appear, one turn later, at the closest unblocked map edge hex, in any formation desired.

2. The CSA RW Supply arrives at 9:00 a.m., the 29th, at area A.

3. Remove the 3v Supply wagon from both Scenario 2 and 6 set ups. The wagon enters at 5:00 a.m. on the 29th with McDowell.

2-01 Bloody 110th

1. AM the 38th PzJg Bn (all) to the Historical Order of Arrival to the other units arriving at 0200, 17 Dec 44.

The 273 Flak did not enter the map is correct in not being on the Order of Arrival.

2. Only one German Bridge may be built during the game. If a bridge allows the use of Areas 3 and 4, the player need not wait to reduce Hosingen before using Area 3 when the bridge blew up. Hosingen only makes units wait which are trying to enter Areas 4 or 5.

3. 2 PG Regimental troops, 2x Gw38(t), enter with 2/2 PG in the Historical Order of Arrival.

4. One 38th Pioneer Platoon was printed without a morale. It has the same morale as the others in its company (5.)

2-02 Objective: Schmidt

1. Teaching Scenario #4. Forward Observer, ignore the portion of the U.S. victory Condition that calls for occupation of all of Vossenack.
2. Scenario 3: Ignore the German 150mm Artillery ammo supply. It is not needed.
3. Scenario 5: Under German Artillery Battalies Available, 1/843 should instead be the 1/4/89.
4. The German Fus/275th should have morale boxes for each company, 1 through 4, instead of just one box for the battalion.

3-01 Force Eagle's War

1. Two of 2/E's ITV's were printed with the same info on the front and back. The backs of these units should read P B 15, like the others.

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